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BOYLE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.:
A REASONABLY PRECISE IMMUNITY-SPECIFYING
THE DEFENSE CONTRACTOR'S SHIELD
INTRODUCTION
Military defense contractors produce numerous high-technology weapon
systems that are on the "cutting edge" of technology. Servicemen who
operate these advanced systems, such as high-performance aircraft, face
increased-and unavoidable-risks.' Even ordinary products like vehicles
may be more hazardous to the user when they are designed to military
specifications. 2 In spite of their exposure to inherent danger, servicemen
who operate military systems and use military products are relatively less
protected than civilians by tort law against loss from injury caused by a
manufacturer's design defect. In the private sector, manufacturers can be
held accountable for design defects under the theory of products liability.
Yet, military contractors have found sanctuary in a special defense-the
government contractor defense-whose development has kept pace with the
growth of products liability theory.3 The courts have defined the govern-
ment contractor defense in fluid terms and have relied upon various policy
rationales for doctrinal support in this rapidly evolving area of the law. 4
1. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983) (military
aviators' "reasonable expectations of safety" are much lower than those of ordinary consumers),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 569 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff was a
serviceman injured by a rotating gun turret in a vehicular accident. The court stated that "[olften
dangerous designs must be used in the military context to meet the exigencies of our national
defense, and even military equipment that is relatively safe for every day use may have to be
operated on occasion under dangerous conditions .... " Id.
3. Finn & Martin, Strict Liability in Military Aviation Cases-Should It Apply?, 48 J. AnR
L. & COM. 347 (1983). The terms "government contract defense" and "government contractor
defense" are not interchangeable. The former describes an approach to immunity based on the
contractor's agency relation with the government, while the latter is a modern approach supported
by various policy rationales. As applied, the latter depends primarily on the need to insulate the
military procurement process from the harmful effects of liability judgments. See, e.g., Tozer v.
LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986) (reasons for military contractor defense are constitutional
separation of powers and protecting integrity of military procurement), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2897 (1988). This Note discusses the genesis of the government contractor defense and its
recognition in the courts; therefore it also explains the government contract defense as one of its
precursors.
4. See Note, Government Contract Defense: Sharing the Protective Cloak of Sovereign
Immunity After McKay v. Rockwell International Corp., 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 181 (1985) [hereinafter
Note, Sharing the Protective Cloak]; Note, Liability of a Manufacturer for Products Defectively
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The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of what standards
should govern the government contractor defense in Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp.5 Prior to Boyle, courts protected the government from
claims by servicemen for injuries incident to service based on the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity. 6 The Supreme Court later extended the federal
government's immunity from suits arising from injuries incident to service
to protect the government against third party indemnity claims which arose
from a serviceman's (or his representative's) suit against a contractor. 7
Thus, the serviceman was barred from suing the government but could
seek relief by suing the defense contractor; the contractor, however, was
barred from suing the government for indemnity.' The courts therefore
began to recognize the contractors' need for a separate, principled defense
that took into account the nature of defense contractors, military procure-
ment, and risks.
In Boyle, the Supreme Court formally adopted the government contractor
defense, which was originally derived from two broader defenses. 9 The first
defense to justify an extension of the government's immunity to contractors
was based on an agency relationship between the contractor and the gov-
ernment. The second was grounded upon the contractor's compliance with
contractual specifications and was rooted in negligence principles. In con-
trast to these precursors, the government contractor defense is based on
policy determinations and, at least in Boyle, focuses on the important role
played by the federal government in military procurement.
The precise question presented to the Court in Boyle was whether federal
common law controlled the government contractor defense. The Court held
that there existed uniquely federal interests sufficient to justify the dis-
placement of state tort law and recognized, as a matter of federal common
law, the Ninth Circuit's statement of the elements of the government
contractor defense. ', The majority opinion relied upon the government's
immunity to suit arising from the exercise of official or policy-making
discretion. In particular, the Court held that the government's immunity
under the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Designed by the Government, 23 B.C.L. REv. 1025 (1982); Note, McKay v. Rockwell International
Corp.,: No Compulsion Required for Government Contractor Defense, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1061
(1984); Note, The Government Contractor Defense: Preserving the Government's Discretionary
Design Decisions, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 697 (1984); Note, The Government Contract Defense, 65 U.
DET. L. REV. 89 (1987).
5. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
6. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
7. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
8. See Tobak, A Case of Mistaken Liability: The Government Contractor's Liability for
Injuries Incurred by Members of the Armed Forces, 13 PUB. CONT. L.J. 74 (1982).
9. See, e.g., Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D. Kan. 1983) (government
contractor defense an amalgam of two earlier defenses based on separate principles).
10. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting with approval McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)).
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("FTCA")" defined the scope of federal interests that warranted the
displacement of state law.' 2 In determining whether federal common law
controlled assertions of the government contractor defense, the Court
resolved a split in the circuit courts of appeals over the elements of and
reasons for the defense.
This Note discusses the roots and development of the government con-
tractor defense, focusing upon the federal government's sovereign immunity
and the earliest defenses available to government contractors. It also reviews
the divergent formulations of the defense that existed among the federal
circuit courts when the Supreme Court decided Boyle. The Note examines
the majority and dissenting opinions in Boyle and analyzes whether the
Court's decision was consistent with precedent on the key issue of govern-
mental approval of contractors' designs. Finally, it considers whether Boyle
recognized the Ninth Circuit's version of the defense to the exclusion of
other versions and identifies particular issues relating to the defense which
Boyle did not resolve.
I. BACKGROUND
In Boyle, the Supreme Court accepted the Ninth Circuit's formulation
of the government contractor defense and expressly rejected the Eleventh
Circuit's alternative formulation. The approved version of the defense
depends upon government establishment or approval of specifications,
and upon the contractor complying with those specifications and warning
the government of known defects.' 3 In contrast, the rejected statement
of the defense allowed a contractor to escape liability only if it met one
of two tests with regard to design specifications: first, that the contractor
played only a minimal role, if any, in the government's design decision;
or second, that the contractor fully informed the government of risks
and alternative designs and the government authorized the design not-
withstanding the risks.' 4 In order to understand the two versions of the
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). Generally, the statute waives the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity for the torts of its employees, with certain exceptions. It grants the
federal district courts jurisdiction over suits for damages "caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government." Id. § 1346(b). See also infra notes 22-64
and accompanying text (discussion of courts' construction of the FTCA).
12. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567-71 (5th Cir. 1985) (need to protect
military decisions and discipline from judicial interference, as policy basis for Feres doctrine,
sufficient reason to displace state law). See also infra notes 193-214 and accompanying text
(discussion of the choice of law analysis).
13. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984), quoted with approval in Boyle, 108 S Ct. at 2518.
14. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). When the Supreme Court decided Boyle, the petition for certiorari was
still pending in Shaw, an action in which a Navy pilot's father alleged that the contractor had
defectively designed an aircraft control system. The Eleventh Circuit articulated a test for the
government contractor defense that was unique among courts that had decided the issue because
it differed in both scope and underlying logic. Id. at 738.
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defense 5 discussed by the Court in Boyle, it is useful to trace the devel-
opment of the government contractor defense to its origins. Its roots predate
the rise of the product liability doctrine 6 and instead stem from principles
of governmental immunity, which bar suit brought under any theory, as
well as concepts particularly applicable to negligence actions.
15. The Supreme Court did not expressly address two additional lines of cases that were in
some respects different from both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit decisions. The Agent Orange
litigation produced its own version of the government contractor defense, quite apart from
providing the impetus for decisions in other circuits. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). See generally infra note 84 (history of Agent Orange litigation).
Moreover, the Third Circuit cases represent a hybrid of the Agent Orange and Ninth Circuit
approaches. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on 9/11/82, 769 F.2d 115 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). For a discussion of these other approaches and
their bearing upon the meaning of the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle, see infra notes 255-63
(Agent Orange approach) and notes 268-73 (Third Circuit approach) and accompanying text.
16. Products liability refers to the area of the law involving the liability of sellers of chattels
to third persons with whom they are not in privity of contract. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 641
(4th ed. 1971). See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). There are three theories of liability under which a products liability action
may be brought: negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY,
AMERIcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LiABnLrTY § 1:2, at 7 (2d ed. 1974). Negligence actions have to some
extent yielded to breach of warranty and strict liability actions, partly because the other theories
do not require proof of specific negligence. Id. § 2:1, at 144. The theory of recovery in a breach
of warranty action is contractual and does not depend on the negligence of the manufacturer or
seller. The action may be limited, however, by a requirement of privity of contract with the
defendant. Id. § 3:1, at 428.
Strict liability may be imposed on a seller or a manufacturer who places an article on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects. Id. § 4:1, at 638. The
elements of a strict liability action include proof that the product was defective and unreasonably
dangerous, that a causal connection existed between the defect and the plaintiff's injuries, and
that the defendant was connected with the product. Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS defines strict product liability as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
The manufacturer may also have a duty to warn of risks or dangers in the use of the product.
Id. at §§ 388-389. Failure to provide a warning may result in either negligence or a strict liability
suit because the lack of warning constitutes a defect. R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, supra, § 2:1, at
144.
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A. Historical Background-Sovereign Immunity and the FTCA
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the government
unless it has consented to be sued. 17 In the doctrine's earliest form it meant
"the King can do no wrong."'" The growth of governmental activity,
particularly at the federal level, brought the realization that it was unfair
to bar suits by individuals who had been injured by such activity.19 The
only available avenue for relief was private legislation, an unwieldy and
generally unsatisfactory approach. 20 Congress therefore enacted the Federal
Tort Claims Act, which waived the federal government's sovereign im-
munity but also provided for certain statutory exceptions to the waiver. 2'
By enacting the legislation, Congress expressed the federal government's
consent to be sued for the negligence or other tortious conduct of its
employees. 22
The FTCA retains the bar to suits by members of the armed forces for
injuries sustained in wartime 3 and to suits against officials acting in a
policy-making or discretionary capacity. 4 The judicial construction of each
of these particular exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of immunity has played
a significant role in the development of the government contractor defense.
The government's immunity from suit for injuries sustained by members
17. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
18. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
19. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139-40 (1950).
20. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 24-25 ("[Tlhe private bill device was notoriously clumsy. Some
simplified recovery procedure for the mass of claims was imperative.") (footnote omitted).
21. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). Section 1346(b) waives sovereign immunity:
[Flor injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent
or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. For a discussion of the statute, see Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline, and the Weapons
of War, 29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 383, 400-02 (1985) (criticizing Feres); Harris & Schnepper, Federal
Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Exception Revisited, 31 U. MIMI L. REV. 161 (1976)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)); Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.
L. REV. 24, 40-42 (1976) (same); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have
Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099, 1102-09 (1979) (same).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982).
23. Id. § 26800) (excludes "[any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war").
24. Section 2680(a) provides that the FTCA's waiver of immunity does not apply to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
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of the armed forces incident to their service, known as the Feres doctrine 2 5
was crucial in the development of the government contractor defense. The
government also retained immunity against actions that alleged negligence
in the government's exercise of discretionary functions, and the policy goals
of the government contractor defense were borrowed largely from this
second type of retained immunity. 26 In this section, the case law construing
each of these FTCA exceptions will be discussed.
1. Feres-Stencel Doctrine
The FTCA abrogated only a portion of the federal government's sov-
ereign immunity. For example, the Act retained the bar to suits by serv-
icemen for injuries they sustained in wartime.2 7 The Supreme Court therefore
encountered the question whether the FTCA permitted servicemen's suits
under certain conditions. First, the Court held that a serviceman could
bring a negligence action against the government if his injuries had not
arisen incident to service. 28 In Feres v. United States,2 9 however, the Court
held that if a serviceman's death or injury arose out of or in the course
of activity incident to service, the government's immunity remained intact.
The Court reasoned, based on the FTCA's text, that Congress had intended
to bar suits for injuries arising incident to service.30
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,3' the Court reiterated
its support of Feres and applied its reasoning to contractors' third party
25. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The action was brought for the wrongful
death of an active duty serviceman. The plaintiff's decedent had been killed in a barracks fire
allegedly caused by the Army's negligence. Id. at 137.
26. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1988).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 26806) (1982).
28. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). The Court held that the FTCA did not bar
a suit against the government by a serviceman who was injured in a collision with an Army
vehicle on a public highway because his injuries were not incident to service. The Court expressly
left open the issue of whether injuries incident to service were also within the FTCA's wavier of
immunity. Id. at 52-53.
29. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). A significant question under the Feres doctrine is whether injuries
arose from or incident to service. See generally I L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS:
ADMINISTATrVE AND JurDciAL REMEDIES § 4, at 1-23 to 1-59 (1989 & Supp.) (discussing causes
of action against government and cases considering whether particular injuries were from or
incident to service).
The Feres doctrine has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d
1530, 1535 (11 th Cir. 1985) (Feres subjected to heavy criticism but, nevertheless, it is still the law),
rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 681 (1987).
30. Feres, 340 U.S. at 135. First, the FTCA provided for governmental liability in those
situations where a private individual would have been liable. Since there was no parallel liability
to that sought to be imposed on the military, the Court ruled that governmental immunity had
not been abrogated. Id. at 141-42. Second, even though the FTCA looked to state law to determine
liability, Congress did not intend that state law govern the "distinctly federal character" of the
relationship between the federal government and members of the Armed Forces. Id. at 142-44.
Finally, the fact that the Veterans' Benefits Act provided compensation within statutory limits
precluded the extension of liability in tort. Id. at 144-45.
31. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
1990] BOYLE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP. 831
indemnity claims against the government.2 In Stencel, the Supreme Court
held that Feres barred defense contractors' indemnity suits against the
government.33 Although Stencel created problems for contractors who were
sued by servicemen injured by defectively designed products, it is significant
primarily because the Court relied on three principal arguments and reaf-
firmed the Feres doctrine.3 4
The Court held that the logical bases of Feres were equally applicable
to a third party indemnity action. First, the Court found the relationship
between the government and defense contractors to be as federal in nature
as the relationship between the government and servicemen.35 Thus, just
as the liability of the government to a serviceman did not vary according
to the fortuity of the place where the alleged negligence occurred, neither
could the situs affect the government's liability to a contractor for precisely
the same injury.36 Second, the Stencel Court reasoned that allowing the
contractor to be indemnified by the federal government would in effect
allow compensation to be paid to servicemen in excess of the statutory
limits set by the Veterans' Benefits Act.37 In oft-quoted language, the Court
refused "to judicially admit at the back door that which has been legisla-
tively turned away at the front door." 3 Third, the Court stated that the
detrimental impact on military discipline would be the same in the con-
tractor's suit for indemnity as in the suit by the serviceman barred under
Feres. The same issues would be litigated, leading to second-guessing of
military orders and requiring servicemen to testify against each other. 9
32. Id. at 672. A third party indemnity action arises when, for example, a manufacturer,
which had been sued by a serviceman for the allegedly defective design of military equipment,
sues the federal government for indemnity after settling the original claim with the serviceman.
Id. at 668.
33. The plaintiff was a National Guardsman injured when he ejected from an aircraft and
the system malfunctioned. Id. at 667.
34. As restated by the Stencel Court, the Feres doctrine was derived from the distinctively
federal character of the relation between military personnel and the government, requiring that
the government's liability not depend on the fortuity of the situs of the alleged wrong. Id. at 671.
Further, Congress intended the no-fault compensation system provided for in the Veterans' Benefits
Act, 38 U.S.C. § 321 (1982), to be an exclusive remedy. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 671. Finally, the
Stencel Court restated the need to place military discipline and decisions beyond the reach of
civilian courts. Id. (citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)); see also Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (military discipline justifies invoking separation of powers doctrine
to place military decisions beyond judicial review).
35. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672.
36. Id.
37. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-362 (1982). The statute "provides a swift, efficient remedy for the
injured serviceman, but it also clothes the Government in the 'protective mantle of the Act's
limitation-of-liability provisions."' Stencel, 431 U.S. at 673 (citing Cooper Stevedoring Co. v.
Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 115 (1974)).
38. Id. at 673 (quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972)). The "turned away"
legislation referred to by the Court was the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-
2680 (1982).
39. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977).
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The decision confirmed that a serviceman injured by an allegedly defective
product would be barred by Feres from suing the government and would
have to bring an action against the contractor; the contractor, however,
would not be able to sue the government for indemnity. 40 Thus, Stencel
strongly encouraged recognition of a government contractor defense.
Notwithstanding heavy criticism from courts and commentators,4 ' the
Feres doctrine has survived because the Court came to view it as necessary
to protect military discipline and to insulate military decisions from re-
view. 42 The Court did not regard the scope of Feres' bar to servicemen's
suits as fixed and revised the doctrine's underlying logic as circumstances
required .43
40. See Tobak, supra note 8, at 77 (contractor only defendant available to injured serviceman
under Feres, but same doctrine precludes contractor's third party indemnity action).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700-01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Feres was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the 'widespread, almost universal criticism' it
has received.") (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 818 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1987)). See also Bennett, supra note 21, at 400-02
(criticizing Feres); Rhodes, supra note 21, at 40-42 (same); Note, supra note 21, at 1102-09 (same).
42. The Supreme Court expanded its argument concerning military discipline in United States
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954), which involved alleged negligence on the part of the Veterans
Administration. The argument was the one that the Court would later endorse as the primary
support for Feres. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985). Brown held that allowing
military personnel to sue the government would be harmful to discipline. The Court noted the
unique relationship between a soldier and those in command and stated that allowing suits arising
from military orders or duty could lead to "extreme results." Brown, 348 U.S. at 112.
43. After first augmenting the support for the Feres doctrine, the Court then began to call
the original logic of Feres into question. The first argument to be undermined was that the FTCA
could not be construed to allow a suit which arose from governmental activity that lacked a
private analogue. In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955), which involved the
Coast Guard's alleged negligent operation of a lighthouse, the Court held that the FTCA did not
exclude liability for an activity unique to the government. "[W]e would be attributing bizarre
motives to Congress were we to hold that it was predicating liability on such a completely
fortuitous circumstance-the presence or absence of identical private activity." Id. at 67 (footnote
omitted).
Then, the Court ruled that the FTCA did not preclude novel and unprecedented causes of
action. In Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), the court allowed an FTCA action
for the alleged negligence of federal firefighters. The Court stated, "[ilt may be that it is 'novel
and unprecedented' to hold the United States accountable for the negligence of its firefighters,
but the very purpose of the Tort Claims Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-
encompassing immunity from tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental
liability." Id. at 319. Thus, when the Court recognized the shift in the logic underlying the Feres
doctrine in United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), it also set the stage for its recent express
refashioning of the doctrine so as to make it serve the need for military discipline. See United
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
In Muniz, the Court held that claims brought by federal prisoners were not barred under the
FTCA; "[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the 'peculiar and special relationship
of the soldier to his superiors, [and] the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline."'
Muniz, 374 U.S. at 162 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). As the
impact on discipline was thought not to be significant even in the prison context, and because
the lack of uniformity of recovery under state law was an insufficient reason to disallow all
recovery, the Court held the action to be allowed under the FTCA. Id. at 161-62.
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Most recently, the Court rewrote the logic underlying the Feres decision
in United States v. Shearer.44 Although the Court held that the plaintiff's
action was barred under the intentional tort exception to the FTCA, 45 it
nevertheless realigned the Feres doctrine so that it focused upon the need
to uphold military discipline. 46 Because the Shearer Court grounded Feres
44. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). A serviceman was killed in an assault and battery committed by an
enlisted man. Plaintiff for the decedent claimed that the Army negligently failed to control the
serviceman. The court of appeals held that Feres did not control, ruling that an off-duty serviceman
not on a military base and not engaged in a military activity when injured generally could bring
an action under the FTCA. Shearer v. United States, 723 F.2d 1102, 1106 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd,
473 U.S. 52 (1985).
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the situs of the serviceman's murder was less important
than preventing a civilian court from second-guessing military decisions and impairing discipline.
Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 (citing Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673
(1977)). The Court also rejected the plaintiff's attempt to convert a claim growing out of an
assault and battery into one for negligence (in the Army's control of the assailant), which would
be actionable under section 1346(b) of the FTCA. The statute does not waive immunity for "[any
claim arising out of assault [or] battery." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982).
In contrast, in Sheridan v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988), the petitioners claimed they
were injured by an inebriated, armed, off-duty serviceman whom government guards had negli-
gently allowed to attack them. The Fourth Circuit held that section 2680(h), the intentional tort
exception of the FTCA, precluded suit against the government. Sheridan v. United States, 823
F.2d 820, 822-23 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 2449 (1988). The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that section 2680(h) did not bar suit when assault and battery occurred outside the general
waiver of sovereign immunity. Sheridan, 108 S. Ct. at 2455. Because the assailant was not acting
within the scope of his employment, his tortious conduct could not give rise to government liability
and the intentional tort exception would not apply. Id. Nevertheless, the negligence alleged on
the part of the guards was actionable regardless of either the assailant's employment status or the
nature of his conduct. Id.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982). See supra note 44 (discussion of Supreme Court interpretations
of that section).
46. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57-59. The Court had underscored that the key logical basis of Feres
was the uniqueness of the military situation in Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
In Chappell, five enlisted men alleged that naval officers had violated their constitutional rights,
and they sued under the rule stated in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), which allowed an individual to sue a federal official who had violated the plaintiff's
constitutional rights so long as "special factors" were not present. Id. at 396-97. The Court
recognized that certain "special factors," such as the military's unique need for discipline and
immediate obedience to orders, existed in Chappell and precluded a suit by the enlisted men.
Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299. While the Court referred to the Feres logic, it emphasized the discipline
argument advanced by the Brown Court. Id. at 299. The Court added that Congress' plenary
constitutional authority over defense matters brought the concern for discipline into the separation
of powers context. Id. at 300.
Moreover, the Court had then recently considered the nexus between the separation of powers
and judicial reticence to question military judgment:
It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action
that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches directly
responsible-as the Judicial Branch is not-to the electoral process. Moreover, it is
difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition,
training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military
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on a new policy rationale 4' it had to restate the key inquiry that would be
determinative of immunity. The question under Feres became whether the
suit would involve judicial second-guessing of military decisions or impair
military discipline s.4 Thus, the reasons asserted earlier for the Feres-Stencel
doctrine-the perceived need for uniformity in decisions concerning the
rights of servicemen, and the exclusive remedy provisions of the Veterans'
Benefits Act-are "no longer controlling." ' 49
The Feres doctrine has played a key role in the development of the
government contractor defense. Its extension to defense contractors' in-
demnity actions drew attention to their liability to servicemen who could
not sue the government. Moreover, as the doctrine came to represent the
judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (emphasis in original), quoted with approval in Chappell,
462 U.S. at 302. Thus, these factors and the fact that Congress had not provided a remedy for
the alleged wrongs brought the case within the "special factors" that precluded recognizing a
Bivens-type action. Id. at 304.
47. See Brown v. United States, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954).
48. The Court stated that Feres-Stencel extended immunity to the type of case that involves
sensitive military affairs and may potentially undercut military discipline and effectiveness. Shearer,
473 U.S. at 59.
49. Id. at 58 n.4. The Court, however, has not completely abandoned the other reasons
supporting the Feres doctrine. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). The action
arose when a Coast Guard helicopter, under radar control of the Federal Aviation Administration,
crashed into a mountain and killed the pilot. The pilot's widow sued the government alleging
negligence on the part of the FAA air traffic controllers. Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d
1530, 1531 (1lth Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing en banc, 779 F.2d 1492 (llth'Cir. 1986) (per
curiam), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 681 (1987). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff against the government's Feres-based contention that the pilot's death occurred
incident to active duty and that therefore the action for his death was barred. Johnson, 779 F.2d
at 1494. The court reasoned that, after Shearer, the test for whether suit was barred in a fact
pattern where the negligence alleged involved a civilian government employee and not a serviceman
hinged on whether the action would impact detrimentally on military decisions and discipline. Id.
Here, the court held there existed no nexus between the pilot's duty and the civilian employees.
Id.
The Supreme Court reversed. The apparent shift in logic in Shearer notwithstanding, the Court
reiterated the three Feres arguments restated by the Court in Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United
States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977). Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689-92. The Court's first argument
emphasized the federal character of the soldier-government relationship which dictates that the
government's liability not depend on the situs of the alleged wrong. Id. at 689. The Court also
reasoned that the Veterans' Benefits Act was enacted in lieu of tort remedies and that governmental
liability would have a detrimental impact upon military decisions and discipline. Id. at 690-92.
Because the Court found a link between discipline and allowance of the action, liability was
barred.
Justice Scalia submitted a forceful dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
in which he refuted the Feres "rationales" as support for governmental immunity. Id. at 692
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent objected that the text of the FTCA did not support the
reasoning underlying Feres and indicated that if the respondent had advocated overruling Feres,
only stare decisis would commend upholding the doctrine. Id. at 703. Thus, when Justice Scalia
wrote the majority opinion in Boyle, it was necessary for him to define the predicate of contractor
immunity without reference to Feres.
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courts' protective attitude toward military discipline, the policy basis un-
derlying the government contractor defense began to emerge. Feres, how-
ever, shared its influential role in the courts' view of defense contractors'
liability with a second exception to the FTCA's waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity: the discretionary function exception.
2. Discretionary Function Exception
The government contractor defense is closely related to the government's
immunity to suit for discretionary functions, which is preserved under the
FTCA.50 The Supreme Court construed the discretionary function exception
in the seminal case of Dalehite v. United States." In Dalehite, the plaintiffs'
claims arose from an explosion of fertilizer that leveled an entire city.52
The Court recognized that the FTCA did not provide a precise definition
of discretionary functions53 because the purpose of the FTCA was to protect
executives or administrators who had acted according to their best judg-
ment.14 Nevertheless, the Court held that the definition of discretionary
functions or duties extended beyond decisions to undertake programs and
included those decisions necessary to implement a program.5 The Court
stated that the test to determine whether a government official had per-
formed a discretionary function should focus on whether the decision at
issue involved "planning" as opposed to merely "operational" choices. 6
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). Congress retained immunity against "[a]ny claim based upon
an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, . . . based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty."
Id.
51. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
52. The disaster occurred at Texas City, Texas and involved fertilizer which was made from
war surplus compounds and was to be shipped to Europe as part of the United States' foreign
aid program. The governmental decisions in question concerned the coating, packaging, and
labeling of the fertilizer. Id. at 39-41.
53. Id. at 35. The Court also recognized, however, that "[w]here there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion." Id. at 36.
54. The "discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment
of the best course [is] a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law." Id. at 34
(footnote omitted).
55. The Court defined "implementing decisions" to include "determinations made by execu-
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of operations." Id. at 35-
36 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 42 (discretion is lacking in operational choices). For example, in a case that also
involved the earliest form of the government contractor defense, Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Conn. 1965), the court held that the government's decision
concerning the means of carrying out its responsibility was clearly discretionary.
The scope of governmental immunity for discretionary functions did not remain as broad as
Dalehite might have allowed. Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957) (United States
accountable for negligence of its firefighters notwithstanding lack of parallel private liability);
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (United States' liability not restricted to
parallel liability of municipal bodies). Some courts have observed that virtually every decision
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The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the scope of discre-
tionary function immunity occurred in United States v. S.A. Empresa De
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines).57 The plaintiffs, who had
been injured in aircraft fires, challenged the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's ("FAA") programs of certification and inspection of air transport
aircraft.5" In Varig Airlines, the Court redefined the scope of the immunity
conferred by the statutory discretionary function exception. 9 The Court
determined that the test should focus on the actor's conduct rather than
the actor's status. Therefore, if the acts comprising the basis of suit "are
of the nature and quality that Congress" 60 sought to protect, then the
discretionary function exception applied and the planning-operational dis-
tinction was immaterial. 6 1 The Court stated that the FTCA's legislative
involves at least some element of discretion. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 246
(5th Cir. 1967) ("Unless government officials (at no matter what echelon) make their choices by
flipping coins, their acts involve discretion in making decisions."), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841
(1967).
Although courts have been inconsistent in deciding cases that have raised the question, discre-
tionary decisions generally have been found where "policy" was involved. See, e.g., Evangelical
United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 255, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (1965) (setting forth
factors pertinent to making planning-operational distinction).
The Fifth Circuit confronted the question of whether the discretionary function exception
protected decisions relating to military procurement in Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d
585 (5th Cir. 1973). In that case, a test pilot, who was employed by a civilian contractor, was
killed when an ejection seat fired while the aircraft was on the ground. The mishap was ultimately
traced to a mechanic's removal of what had been intended to be a permanently installed component
of the ejection seat assembly. Id. at 588. The plaintiff sued both the mechanic's employer and
the federal government. The court recognized that aircraft design decisions are made at the
planning level; nevertheless, the court held that the discretionary function exception did not
immunize the decision to accept a negligently designed or constructed system. Id. at 598. See also
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1987) (court relied on Feres
doctrine and discretionary function immunity in affirming dismissal of suit against United States
by plaintiffs who had opted-out of class action).
57. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). The Court considered the general scheme of the FAA regulations as
well as the express statutory grant of discretionary authority to design an inspection program. Id.
at 804-07, 814-21.
58. In the first of two consolidated suits, an aircraft caught fire, resulting in the deaths of
124 persons; the other action involved an aircraft heater alleged to have violated the FAA's safety
regulations. Id. at 800, 803.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' challenges to the FAA program. First, the agency delegated
primary responsibility for determinations as to certificating aircraft at each of three stages (design,
production, and airworthiness) to manufacturers. In so doing, the agency not only served its dual
responsibilities of promoting and regulating civil aviation, but also acted pursuant to statutory
authority. Id. at 816. Second, the agency program of spot-check inspections to monitor compliance
with safety standards was similarly protected by statutory authority given to the FAA administrator.
Id. at 819. Therefore, the judicial construction of the discretionary function exception that began
in Dalehite placed the FAA's program well inside the limits of functions or duties Congress sought
to protect in section 2680(a). Id. at 820.
59. Id. at 813 ("[S]everal factors [are] useful in determining when the acts of a Government
employee are protected from liability by § 2680(a).").
60. Id.
61. Id. The shift from the planning-operational analysis has generally been recognized in the
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history indicated that Congress sought to retain the government's immunity
from suit for the regulatory acts of federal agencies 62 and intended to
shield decisions, whether legislative or administrative, from being second-
guessed through judicial review. 63
The government's retained immunity from suit under the FTCA depends
upon the Supreme Court's interpretation of statutory provisions. Feres and
Varig Airlines expanded the government's retained immunity under the
FTCA. A contractor who produces equipment to meet the needs of national
defense, however, cannot count on any primary immunity to actions by
servicemen alleging liability for defectively designed products. Nevertheless,
the contractor may be protected from suit by an extension of the govern-
ment's immunity under certain circumstances, even though the contractor
is not literally part of the sovereign state. In addition, by virtue of the
government's having determined the contract specifications, the contractor
may have a second defense. Both of these defenses are discussed in the
following section.
B. Precursors of the Government Contractor Defense
Government contractors sought to establish defenses to suits arising from
their contractual work long before the modern defense began to develop.
federal courts of appeals. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 800 F.2d
1187, 1195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Mitchell v. United States, 787 F.2d 466, 468 (9th Cir. 1986);
Begay v. United States, 768 F.2d 1059, 1062 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985); Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 513
(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984). But see Alabama Elec. Coop. v. United
States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1528 (lth Cir. 1985) (planning-operational distinction is valid as proxy
for evaluation of social, political, or economic policy factors). See generally 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 249.05, at 12-127 to 12-156 (1989 & Supp.) (collecting cases following
Varig in sundry fact patterns).
62. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 810.
63. The retention of immunity is designed to "protect the Government from liability that
would seriously handicap efficient government operations." Id. at 814 (quoting United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963)). Applied to the FAA's conduct in issuing type certificates for
the aircraft, section 2680(a) barred a negligence action. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 816. Under a
statutory grant of discretion, the FAA had exercised regulatory authority to determine how its
regulations would be enforced. The Court held that it was within the agency's discretion to balance
its objectives against practical constraints. Id. at 820. Moreover, such an agency decision was
immune to judicial "second-guessing." Id. Cf. Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988) (limiting
immunity of officials for acts performed within scope of their duty grounded, in part, on protecting
functions of government from restraint imposed by tort suits).
After the Supreme Court's decision in Varig Airlines, a federal district court considered the
government contractor defense in light of the discretionary function exception. Ramey v. Martin-
Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 874 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1989). The
court allowed the defense to apply against claims involving an allegedly defectively designed
ejection seat in a full-scale development version of the U.S. Navy/McDonnell-Douglas F-18 fighter
aircraft. Further, the court distinguished Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir.
1973), criticizing that earlier decision for its incorrect reading of Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953), and the discretionary function exception. Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 992.
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In particular, courts recognized that a contractor's status as a government
agent precluded liability. Moreover, under certain principles of negligence,
contractors avoided liability where the source of specifications was beyond
their control.
1. Yearsley and the Government Contract Defense
The earliest defenses afforded to contractors were derived from a broad
interpretation of the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Supreme Court first
extended the federal government's immunity to a contractor in Yearsley v.
W.A. Ross Construction Co. 64 The defendant contracted to build dikes for
the government, and its work caused flooding to plaintiff's land. The
plaintiff sued the contractor under the fifth amendment, alleging that he
had been deprived of his property without just compensation. The Supreme
Court held that the contractor's authority had been conferred by Congress
as a proper exercise of its constitutional power. Thus, the government's
agent could not be held liable for actions taken pursuant to validly con-
ferred authority. 65
The primary purpose served by the government contract defense is to
prevent liability imposed on the contractor from subverting the govern-
ment's immunity through the contractor passing its increased costs to the
government. 66 Moreover, the defense is available only to those contractors
64. 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
65. Id. at 22 ("The action of the agent is the 'act of the government') (citing United States
v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 465 (1903)). The remedy for the alleged taking "exclude[d] liability of
the Government's representatives lawfully acting on its behalf in relation to the taking." Id. at
22.
The defense is well-settled in cases involving defendants who were contractors for public works
projects, generally under the label of the "government contract defense." See, e.g., Myers v.
United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) (in action alleging waste and trespass caused by
road construction, Yearsley established contractor immunity for performance "in conformity with
the terms of [the] contract"); O'Grady v. City of Montpelier, 474 F. Supp. 186, 187-88 (D. Vt.
1979) (following Yearsley, contractor not liable for performing contract with government in
accordance with specifications in inverse condemnation action arising from flooding caused by
construction); Green v. ICI America, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (contractor
shares sovereign immunity of government where orders of government were carried out in operation
of Army ammunition plant). See generally Annotation, Right of Contractor with Federal, State
or Local Public Body to Latter's Immunity From Tort Liability, 9 A.L.R.3d 382 (1966) (collecting
cases following Yearsley).
66. For example, in Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn.
1965), the plaintiff's leasehold interest had been damaged by fumes from dredged material deposited
by defendant on land owned by the defendant and the federal government pursuant to a contract.
Id. at 825. The court followed Yearsley because the work had been performed under valid
contractual authority and the contractor had merely done what it had been required to do. Id. at
827. Since the government had responsibility to take precautions regarding the fumes, the contractor
could not be held liable for the government's omission. The court reasoned that imposing liability
on the contractor would lead to increased contract prices and thereby subvert the discretionary
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who perform as directed by the contract and without carelessness or
negligence. 6 It was this type of immunity that manufacturers of military
equipment attempted to assert before the government contractor defense
gained recognition. 6 Yet, as it was analytically dependent upon the exis-
tence of an agency relation between the government and the contractor,
the original government contract defense proved to be only marginally
useful .69
2. Contract Specifications Defense
Government contractors sought to protect themselves from liability for
work performed pursuant to their contracts by asserting a second defense
that did not depend upon proof of an agency relationship between the
function exception. Id.
In Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Atkinson, 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961), the court added
a requirement of compulsion to the government contract defense. The action arose from damage
caused by the collapse of a cofferdam constructed by the defendant. Id. at 15. The court noted
that the contractor had discretion to determine the details of the construction and stated that it
is "elementary that compulsion must exist before the 'government contract defense' is available."
Id. at 16 (emphasis in original). Because the defendant had considerable discretion, it was evident
that it had not been required to perform the acts charged as negligent. Id.
67. Id.
68. Military defense contractors turned to the government contract defense first recognized in
Yearsley notwithstanding its primary application to public works contractors. See supra note 66.
In one of the first cases, the court interpreted the terms of the contract and the nature of the
contractors' performance to find that the contractors could not share in the government's immunity.
Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969), arose from injuries sustained
by a serviceman when a hand grenade exploded prematurely. The plaintiff premised his action on
the theories of negligence in manufacture, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Id. at 1012.
One defendant manufactured the grenade; the second, the fuse. The first manufacturer asserted
the government contract defense and relied on the fact that the plant was owned by the government,
which also had performed inspection of the assembled grenades. The court held that the manu-
facturer was an independent contractor and not protected by the government's immunity. Id. at
1014. The court deemed the second defendant an independent contractor in spite of the govern-
ment's provision of the inspection device used to test the fuses. The decision expressly turned on
the court's ruling that the contractors were not agents of the government; therefore they were not
entitled to share in the government's immunity. Id. at 1014-15. The plaintiff's strict liability and
breach of warranty claims were dismissed, but his negligence claim was allowed to proceed,
evidently because it involved "negligent manufacture of [defendants'] products." Id. at 1018.
Foster v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974), arose on facts similar to
Whitaker. In deciding that the trial court was correct in its ruling, which denied the defendants
the protection afforded by the government's sovereign immunity, the court of appeals held that
the government contract defense was unavailable in an action based on strict liability. In Foster,
the defendant lost the protection which the government's specifications would have provided
because it had "assemble[d] a defectively made grenade." Id. at 874 n.5. It has become clear that
the contractor cannot avoid liability for defects in manufacture, as opposed to defects in design,
by establishing the elements of the government contractor defense. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (91h Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
69. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1985) (uncertain availability
of Yearlsey defense makes it precarious for contractors).
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government and the contractor: the contract specifications defense. The
specifications defense applied to any contractor who had carefully followed
specifications provided by another, whether that "other" was the govern-
ment or a private party. Unless the specifications were so obviously defec-
tive and dangerous that no reasonable contractor would have carried them
out, there would be no liability. 70 The theory of the contract specifications
defense has consistently been that there is no liability for performing a
contract when another party determined the contract specifications. 71 The
reason underlying the defense is that the average contractor is not expected
to possess the requisite knowledge or expertise to evaluate the government's
contract specifications. Contractors who possess special knowledge about
a particular design, however, may be held to a higher standard of care. 72
Because the contract specifications defense is based on negligence prin-
ciples, it does not apply to strict liability or breach of warranty actions. 73
Moreover, the defense applies only to contract specifications that are
mandated by the government; because the military procurement process
involves substantial interplay between the government and the manufac-
turer, military contractors may not easily apply the specifications defense
in their industry. 74 The contract specifications defense therefore proved
inadequate to protect contractors from product liability actions, hastening
the recognition of the government contractor defense.
C. The Government Contractor Defense
Courts first established the government contractor defense after recog-
nizing that the Yearsley line of authority, the contract specifications de-
70. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 681 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
404 comment a (1965).
71. Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 46, 145 N.E. 321, 321-22 (1924) ("a
builder or contractor is justified in relying upon the plans and specifications which he has contracted
to follow unless they are so apparently defective that an ordinary builder of ordinary prudence
would be put upon notice that the work was dangerous and likely to cause injury"). Accord
RESTATEMENT 2D TORTS § 404 comment a (1965).
72. See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d at 563 ("[Sipecial knowledge would in certain circumstances
subject contractor to higher standard of care."); Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351,
354 (D. Kan. 1983) (where manufacturer has special knowledge, he may be held to standard of
care as designer).
73. See, e.g., Challoner v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82-83 (5th Cir.), vacated
on other grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (per curiam). Compare McCabe Powers Co. Shop v. Sharp,
594 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Ky. 1980) (liability for design defect should not be imposed on nonde-
signer) with Hunt v. Blasius, 55 11. App. 3d 14, 17-20, 370 N.E.2d 617, 620-22 (1977) (defense
applies to strict liability claims and decreases government's costs), aff'd on other grounds, 74 Il.
2d 203, 34 N.E.2d 368 (1978).
74. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988) (government
contractor defense intended to protect contractor participation in design); Tozer v. LTV Corp.,
792 F.2d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 1986) ("uninhibited assistance" of defense contractors crucial to
technological advances), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704
F.2d 444, 450 (9th Cir. 1983) (defense intended to avoid interference with contractor participation),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
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fense, and the discretionary function immunity all converged into a single
doctrine applicable to military contractors defending against product lia-
bility suits. 75 Thus, there was no liability for following the Army's speci-
fications, 76 even where the action was brought under a theory of strict
liability rather than negligence. 77 When courts derived the government
contractor defense, they were concerned primarily with cases arising from
injuries to members of the Armed Forces that were caused by military
equipment.78 But the two forerunners of the government contractor de-
fense-the government contract defense 79 and the contract specifications
defense 80-clearly were not limited to military procurement cases. Indeed,
the modern defense extends to civilian procurement contracts.8 ' Thus, prior
to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 2 courts had reviewed the policy
reasons for, and elements of, the immunity afforded government contrac-
tors, including military contractors, under the rubric of the "government
75. See Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J.
Super. 407, 381 A.2d 805 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). The action
arose out of injuries sustained by a passenger in an army jeep when he was thrown from the
vehicle in a mishap. The plaintiff alleged that the failure to include seat belts and a roll bar
amounted to a defect in design. Id. See also Note, Sharing the Protective Cloak, supra note 4,
at 195 (Sanner is typical of earliest decisions involving the government contractor defense).
76. In Sanner, the trial court relied on two principal reasons for recognizing the contractor's
immunity. The jeep's manufacturer had strictly complied with the government's specifications and
the discretionary nature of military design decisions were entitled to be protected from judicial
review. Sanner, 144 N.J. Super. at 9, 364 A.2d at 46-47. The court recognized the specifications
were intended "to assure finality of military decisions regarding the design and construction of
military vehicles." Id.
77. Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 154 N.J. Super. 407, 409-10, 381 A.2d 805, 806 (1977), cert.
denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978). The rise of the government contractor defense was
given further impetus shortly after Sanner in Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428
N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). In that case, the proprietor of a pizza shop had acquired a
dough mixer originally built to army specifications for use in field kitchens during World War
II. The owner's son injured his hand in the machine. The court held that the manufacturer was
immune from suit because it had followed the government's specifications in time of war.
Moreover, the court stated that a contractor could rely on specifications even if they were defective
or dangerous. Id. at 350, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 402. Thus, the defense appeared broader in Casabianca,
with the court describing it as a complete defense to any action.
78. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (government contractor
defense applied to military contractors to protect military decisions and procurement), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
79. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
81. See Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (government contractor
defense absolved the government and contractor from liability arising from plaintiff's contracting
a disease while participating in a government vaccination program); Burgess v. Colorado Serum
Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 1985) (government contractor defense extended to include
government contracts generally, rather than limiting the defense to military matters).
82. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988). The cases in the courts of appeals that led to conflicting formulations
were actions arising from defects in military equipment. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d
403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (companion case to Boyle, referring specifically to the "military contractor
defense"), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
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contractor defense." 3 This section discusses the various formulations of
the government contractor defense that existed before Boyle. It begins with
the initial statement of the government contractor defense and then follows
it through changes made by the Ninth, Third, and Eleventh Circuits.
1. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation
The government contractor defense was first formulated in In re "Agent
Orange" Product Liability Litigation [hereinafter Agent Orange 1],4 where
83. Boyle, however, expressly reviewed and settled the defense as applied to "Government
contractors liable for design defects in military equipment." Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
In discussing the development of the government contractor defense and the resulting conflict
in the circuits, this Note will use that term, and a narrower military or civilian context will be
indicated where necessary. Quite apart from the matter of defining with sufficient clarity and
predictability the term "military," cf. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th
Cir. 1983) (fighter aircraft's ejection seat obviously military equipment), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984), the Boyle Court's holding justifies extending the defense to civilian sector contractors;
to the extent that the procurement decision involved a discretionary function, the contractor shares
in the government's immunity. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517-18. In fact, Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion objected to what he read as a broad government contractor defense applicable to
nonmilitary products and contractors, such as the NASA space shuttle and the postal service's
mail cars. Id. at 2520 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.) [hereinafter Agent Orange 1], rev'd on other grounds, 635
F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). See generally In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 148-61 (2d Cir. 1987) (discussing background and context of
Agent Orange litigation, summarizes opinions by the Second Circuit as well as the entire history
of the case), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597
F. Supp. 740, 746-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) [hereinafter Agent Orange Settlement Opinion] (commenting
on the case having become a vehicle for Vietnam Veterans' larger grievances), aff'd, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
The Agent Orange litigation arose when Vietnam veterans sought to prove that they had been
injured by exposure to the Agent Orange herbicide, which contained traces of dioxin, an extremely
toxic chemical. See Note, Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 1984 A.F. L. REV. 97
(discussing chemical components and background of contractor defense). The case was heard by
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which decided that the government
contractor defense would be available, but denied defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 792-97.
The district court also ruled that the plaintiffs had presented a question of federal law for
jurisdictional purposes. The Second Circuit reversed, holding federal common law not applicable
to plaintiffs' claims. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Upon remand, the district court ruled that "national consensus
law" applied to the plaintiffs' claims. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp.
690, 694 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
The district court then considered the government contractor defense when the defendants
renewed their motions for summary judgment. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F.
Supp. 1046, 1053-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) [hereinafter Agent Orange II]. The court was the first to
define the elements of the government contractor defense. Id. at 1055. See infra notes 95-98 and
accompanying text. In subsequent rulings, the court applied these elements of the defense, granted
summary judgment to particular contractors, and ruled that the first two elements of the defense
had been established with respect to those contractors remaining. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
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the use of defoliants during the Vietnam War led to a historic mass tort
Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263, 1270-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
Next, the district court granted class action certification in, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), mandamus denied sub nom. In re Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984).
The district court then approved the settlement of the class action proceeding. Agent Orange
Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 746. The settlement opinion also modified the government
contractor defense to be applied to the remainder of the litigation. Id. at 843-50 (modifying
contractors' duty to warn government of risks of product); see also id. at 795-99 (knowledge of
government was at least equal to that of contractors). See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying
text for further discussion.
The district court next ruled on motions that started to bring the litigation to an end. See In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) [hereinafter
Agent Orange Opt-Out Opinion], aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
2898 (1988). The court granted summary judgment against plaintiffs who had opted out of the
class action. Id. at 1264. Note that this was the only opinion in the litigation in which the
government contractor defense as formulated in Agent Orange II and as modified in Agent Orange
Settlement Opinion was applied to the facts.
Further opinions at this stage of the litigation included In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1221, 1222 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying contractors indemnity from government
after their settlement with plaintiff veterans' wives and children). See generally In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co.), 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(summary judgment granted against veteran's widow), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Fraticelli v. Dow Chem.
Co.), 611 F. Supp. 1285, 1287 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting summary judgment against plaintiffs
exposed to Agent Orange in Hawaii).
The Second Circuit affirmed almost all of the district court's rulings. "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). The appellate
court affirmed the certification of the class action on grounds, inter alia, of the centrality of the
government contractor defense. Id. at 166. It also approved the settlement because of lack of
proof of causality and the government contractor defense. Id. at 173-74. In a key opinion, the
Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment against opt-out plaintiffs on grounds of
the government contractor defense. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 192
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
Further rulings at this stage in the litigation by the Second Circuit included the following:
(1) approved the distribution of the settlement, in part, and remanded. See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1987);
(2) affirmed dismissal of a direct action against the government on Feres doctrine and discre-
tionary function immunity grounds. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Aguiar v.
United States), 818 F.2d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 1987);
(3) affirmed summary judgment against veterans' dependents' direct action against government,
on Feres and discretionary function immunity grounds. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig. (Adams v. United States), 818 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004
(1988);
(4) affirmed dismissal of a third party indemnity action against the government by the con-
tractors. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Dow Chem. Co. v. United States), 818
F.2d 204, 206-07 (2d Cir. 1987); and,
(5) affirmed dismissal of civilians' actions against the government and manufacturers. See In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Dow Chem. Co. v. Fraticelli), 818 F.2d 210, 215 (2d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
For a thorough discussion of the merits of the government contractor defense that focuses on
the government's need for discretionary decisionmaking, see Comment, Agent Orange and the
Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liability?, 36
U. MIAMI L. Rav. 489 (1982).
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action. In that complex case, individual veterans of the Vietnam conflict
brought actions against manufacturers of the Agent Orange defoliant,
alleging that exposure had caused both present and unrealized harms. The
district court stated and evaluated the policy reasons supporting the gov-
ernment contractor defense in ruling on the defendants' motions for sum-
mary judgment, s" which had asserted the defense. The court laid the
groundwork for formulating the defense's elements8 6 by first stating that
the defense would ensure fair treatment of defense contractors as well as
protect the government from absorbing the costs of contractor liability. 7
The district court adopted a broad policy basis for the defense, an
approach which directly facilitated its use by other courts."s The court
reasoned that the deterrent value of potential tort liability was lacking
where a contractor had merely performed the government's plan. 9 More-
over, imposing liability on the contractor would defeat the purpose of
governmental immunity because increased costs would be passed on to the
government. 90 Finally, the Defense Production Act 9l gave the government
the power to compel production of war materiel, leaving the contractor to
choose between suffering a statutory penalty for failing to supply a military
item to the government and completing the contract but absorbing the cost
of liability on its own.92
Once the district court rooted the defense firmly in policy concerns and
linked it to earlier concepts, the court formulated the elements of the
defense, 93 which provided the basis for later circuit court opinions and
ultimately the Supreme Court's decision in Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp.94 The government contractor defense forwarded by the court in In
85. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 796. The court denied defendants' motion for summary
judgment, but ruled that the defense would be available in later phases of the litigation. Judge
Pratt denied defendants' motion because neither the elements of the defense nor the facts needed
to establish it had been adequately presented. In particular, there were disputed factual contentions
concerning the contractors' compliance with specifications and the state of knowledge on the part
of both the contractors and the government about the risks of the product. Id.
86. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1055.
87. Agent Orange 1, 506 F. Supp. at 793. The court reviewed the Yearsley defense and
described the government contractor defense as an amalgam of the government contract defense
and the contract specifications defense. Id. at 792-93. The court relied on the reasoning of Dolphin
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D. Conn. 1965), namely that increased
contractor costs resulting from liability would be transferred to the government. Agent Orange I,
506 F. Supp. at 793.
88. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 448 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting and
modifying elements of defense as stated in Agent Orange IH), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984).
89. Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. at 793.
90. Id. at 794.
91. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2061-2169 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
92. The government has the statutory authority to compel the production of necessary military
items. Id. § 2071. The statute imposes penalties for not complying with orders to produce. Id. §
2073.
93. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
94. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
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re "Agent Orange" Products Liability Litigation,95 [hereinafter Agent Or-
ange II] required a contractor to prove three elements: that the government
had established the product's specifications, that the product met the
specifications in all material respects, and that the government was at least
as well-informed as the defendant about the product's risks.96
In Agent Orange II, the key issue involved the contractors' and govern-
ment's relative knowledge of risks. 9 The chemical companies asserted they
were immune from liability -because the government's knowledge of the
possible hazards in the use of Agent Orange had been at least equal to, if
not greater than their own. The court, however, stated that the defense
would not be available if the contractors knew of hazards that the govern-
ment reasonably might have evaluated in deciding whether to use the
product. Thus, the contractor's participation in determining specifications
was relevant because it shed light on how much knowledge both the
government and the contractors had possessed.98
The Agent Orange litigation represents both the rise and the development
of the government contractor defense. First, because the district court
articulated the underlying policy analysis and the elements of the defense.
95. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
96. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp at 1055. The first two elements involve only minimal
burdens of proof for the contractor. The first is satisfied upon the relatively pro forma showing
that the product the contractor delivered to the government was the product specified under the
contract. Id. at 1056. However, the court indicated that the defense would be considerably weaker
if the contractor received only "performance" as opposed to "product" specifications. Id.
Thus, if the government's specifications gave the contractor only a sense of the mission the
government sought to perform, the contractor would be deemed to be the source of the detailed
specifications. So, the contractor's discretion, implicated in the design process, justifies holding
the contractor liable for defects in the design. On the other hand, if the government approves a
given design, its decision justifies extension of the government's immunity to the contractor;
therefore, the issue of what kind of information underlies the contractor's development work
becomes immaterial. After Boyle, a key question remains as to what constitutes sufficient gov-
ernmental review of specifications. The Supreme Court's omission of the Third Circuit's decisions
on this precise issue is noteworthy. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
97. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1055-58. The district court developed a more complete
policy analysis in Agent Orange II than it had in its original opinion. The court ruled that the
government contractor defense applied to actions brought under strict liability as well as negligence
and breach of warranty theories; that military decisions on weapons production were beyond the
reach of judicial review; and that the contractor's duty to warn the government of risks stemmed
only from the knowledge that the contractor possessed and not from any obligation to conduct
extra tests. Id.
Language in the opinion is consistent with an interpretation of the third element of the defense
which requires the contractor to receive the equivalent of the government's informed consent
regarding production of an item with disclosed risks. The court looked to information that "might
have altered" or "might reasonably have affected the government's decision." Id. at 1057.
Nevertheless, the view taken of the duty to warn element is that it concerns only the contractor's
concealment of known risks or failure to disclose the same. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d
556, 575 n.28 (5th Cir. 1985).
98. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. at 1056.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:825
Second, and more importantly, the federal courts involved in the litigation
applied and refined the defense as the litigation progressed. 9
2. McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.
Although Agent Orange H gave the government contractor defense its
start, the Ninth Circuit's decision in McKay v. Rockwell International
Corp.00 represents the major formulation of the defense.' 0 The McKay
defense differed from the Agent Orange 11 version in that it was limited
to those situations in which the federal government would be immune from
suit under the Feres doctrine.'0 2 McKay thus was confined to suits brought
against contractors by servicemen who would have been barred from suit
against the federal government by the Feres doctrine.' 03
McKay arose from the deaths of two Navy pilots, allegedly caused by
defectively designed ejection systems, in separate crashes of the same type
of aircraft. The court analyzed the policy reasons for deriving a defense
for military contractors out of the earlier, broader defenses,'0 4 and justified
granting immunity to government contractors on the strength of four
99. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 565 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The
court granted summary judgment to certain defendants and allowed the action to continue against
the remaining defendants. Id. at 1270-74. But it held that those remaining defendants had
established the first two elements of the defense. Id. at 1274. The court's review of the factual
issues bearing upon the question whether the government knew as much or more than the
defendants about hazards of the defoliant was exhaustive. Moreover, the court continued to frame
its analysis in terms of "whether this knowledge, if disclosed to the government, might have made
a difference in the government's decision-making process." Id. at 1270. Later opinions in the
litigation relied on refinements in the defense made by various circuit courts of appeals after
Agent Orange II. See infra notes 125-37 and accompanying text.
100. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). See also Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988) (essentially adopting McKay formulation).
101. The case provided significant impetus to the development of the government contractor
defense leading to Boyle. See Miller, Liability and Relief of Government Contractors for Injuries
to Service Members, 104 Mn. L. REv. 1 (1984).
102. The McKay version of the government contractor defense applied to strict liability claims
asserted against "suppliers of military equipment." McKay, 704 F.2d at 449. Contractors could
avoid liability under the McKay version of the defense if the following elements were proved: (1)
the United States was immune from liability under the Feres-Stencel doctrine; (2) the United States
established, or approved, reasonably precise specifications for the equipment; (3) the equipment
conformed to the specifications; and, (4) the supplier warned the United States about patent errors
in the government's specifications or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not to the United States. Id. at 451. The court remanded the case
to determine whether the government had set or approved the ejection system specifications. Id.
at 453.
103. Id. at 451 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)). The McKay court reasoned
that because the government contractor defense was essentially an extension of the government's
sovereign immunity, it applied only in actions where the government in fact was immune from
suit. Id.
104. Id. at 448. The court noted the inadequacy of the immunity granted to contractors in
cases following Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), and of the contract
specifications defense as applied to military contractors. McKay, 704 F.2d at 448.
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arguments. First, because higher prices would result from contractor lia-
bility, the purposes of governmental immunity would be defeated. 05 Sec-
ond, contractor liability would harm the military by thrusting the judiciary
into military decisions; second-guessing of military orders would adversely
affect discipline and security. 0 6 Third, liability would be unfair to con-
tractors and would deter them from taking necessary risks. If contractors
could not negotiate over specifications, terms, and prices, they would have
to choose between refusing to produce an item required during wartime
and incurring a penalty or producing the item at a cost insufficient to
cover the cost of liability insurance. 107 Finally, the defense would encourage
contractors to work closely with the government in researching, developing,
and testing new technology. 0 Moreover, the court reviewed the policies
underlying the products liability doctrine and found them to be wholly
inapplicable to military procurement. 0 9
The McKay court limited the application of the government contractor
defense by linking it to the Feres-Stencel doctrine and tailoring the elements
to serve the policy goals which it found sufficiently compelling to outweigh
the goals of strict liability. In analyzing the nature of military procurement
and the risks inherent in military systems, the court defined the context
for debate over the merits of the defense. The McKay standard became
the most widely adopted formulation of the defense, notwithstanding the
Third and Eleventh Circuits' approaches. The Second," 0 Fourth,"' Fifth," 2
and Seventh" ' Circuits each found McKay to be persuasive. For example,
in Bynum v. FMC Corp.," 4 the Fifth Circuit gave its approval to McKay's
105. Id. at 449 (citing Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977)
(quoting Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972))).
106. Id. at 449.
107. Id. at 449-50.
108. Id. at 450.
109. The court rejected four policy arguments it found supportive of products liability: enterprise
liability, market deterrence, compensation, and implied representation of safety. Id. at 451-53.
Judge Alarcon dissented, arguing that Feres-Stencel should not be extended beyond the govern-
ment so as to include contractors. Id. at 456 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). The dissent also joined
issue on cost increases because contractors already included the risk of liability in their prices.
Finally, the dissent would have required a showing of compulsion regarding a design rather than
merely governmental approval. Id. at 457-59.
110. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 695 (1988).
111. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
112. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985).
113. The Seventh Circuit, in dicta, followed McKay in Tillett v. J.1. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591
(7th Cir. 1985). This diversity action arose from an accident involving a front-end loader that
rolled over and killed a serviceman. The primary issue before the court was whether the district
court had correctly applied Wisconsin law. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover
under Wisconsin law and addressed the government contractor defense issue only in the alternative.
Id. at 595-96.
114. 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff was a national guardsman who brought suit
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treatment of policy concerns;" 5 nevertheless, it did not discuss precisely
how much government involvement in generating specifications was re-
quired before the defense was available." 6
Moreover, three Fourth Circuit decisions (all announced on the same
day) lent weight to McKay as the definitive version of the defense. The
Fourth Circuit recognized the government contractor defense in Tozer v.
LTV Corp."7 and applied it in Dowd v. Textron' 8 and Boyle v. United
against the manufacturer of a military vehicle for injuries he sustained in an accident allegedly
caused by the vehicle's defective design. The decision is especially significant for its choice of law
analysis.
115. Id. at 565. After reviewing the Feres-Stencel doctrine and traditional defenses, the Bynum
court discussed the policy reasons for the modern government contractor defense. Primary among
them were the Feres-Stencel goals of protecting military decisions and discipline, of avoiding
second-guessing of military judgment, and separation of powers concerns. Id. at 560. It also
reiterated the McKay court's other policy reasons. Id. at 565-66. Further, it reviewed the policies
justifying strict liability for defective products and followed McKay's reasoning for rejecting them.
Id. at 571.
116. The parties stipulated that the specifications were set by the federal government. Bynum,
770 F.2d at 574 n.23. The court addressed the third element of the defense, which required the
contractor to warn of known risks. "The primary purpose of this requirement is to enable the
government to make determinations as to the design and use of military equipment based on all
readily available information." Id. at 574. But the court rejected a standard that would have
imposed a duty on the contractor to warn of dangers about which it knew or should have known.
The court construed the third element of the test to require only that the contractor warn the
government about dangers that the contractor recognized but that the government had not. Id.
at 575-76 nn.28-29.
117. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988). As the Supreme Court
noted, the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Tozer was carried forward into Boyle and so Tozer,
although not before the Court for review, was nonetheless a part of the analytic context. See
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2513 (1988).
The court of appeals reversed a jury verdict for plaintiffs. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 409. The action
was brought under the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 &
Supp. V 1987), on theories of negligence and strict liability for defective design and involved an
allegation of design defects in the modification of a naval aircraft's external skin. Id. at 404. The
original panel, which covered bays containing equipment and systems, was one piece, necessitating
that maintenance crews remove it to access any portion of the bays. At the Navy's request, LTV
Corp., the builder of the A-7, designed a "buick hood" panel. The centerline part of the original
panel was secured, and the two parts on either side of the aircraft were hinged along one end
and fastened with a "camloc" along the other, allowing sufficient access. Id.
The action arose when the camloc proved insufficient to secure the access panel, and it opened
during flight, causing Lt. Cdmr. Tozer's aircraft to become uncontrollable and to crash. Plaintiff
argued that the contractor's design was defective because the type of fasteners it selected were
known to wear due to corrosion and to become loose from vibration during flight. Id. at 404-05.
118. 792 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1986). The action arose from a helicopter mishap involving "mast-
bumping," which had plagued the AH-I and UH-I helicopter types manufactured by the defendant.
The problem occurred when the unstable rotor system forced its hub to "bump" the mast
supporting it, almost invariably severing the rotor system with resultant catastrophic loss of the
aircraft. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, applying the
military contractor defense. Id. at 410. The court found several facts to be especially critical,
mainly that the service knew for approximately twelve years that the problem existed but had
rejected proposed solutions based on cost or loss of mission effectiveness and that the contractor
had been as active as the Army in trying to resolve the problem. Id. at 412.
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Technologies."9 In Tozer, rather than reiterating the policy arguments in
McKay, the court emphasized the constitutional separation of powers 2 °
and the process of military procurement as separate bases for recognizing
the defense.' 2' The Fourth Circuit also anticipated the Supreme Court's
decision in Boyle by holding that the defense applied to actions alleging
negligent design as well as to those involving strict liability 22 and by noting
that the defense might be governed by federal common law.2 3
Although originally a springboard for the government contractor de-
fense,124 the Agent Orange litigation ultimately followed McKay, 25 but with
some interpretation. When the issue of approval of the settlement of the
litigation was before the district court' 26 it read the government contractor
defense as being established if the government knew at least as much about
119. 792 F.2d 413 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
120. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 406. The court noted that the design at issue was a "purely military
matter" that was not to be "second-guessed" by laymen: "[t]he judicial branch is by design the
least involved in military matters." Id. at 405. The court viewed the tradeoff between safety and
mission effectiveness as being beyond the competence of a lay jury but nonetheless inherent in
technically sophisticated systems. Id. at 406. The court also stated that review of design decisions
would have a detrimental impact on military discipline; moreover, injured servicemen were not
left without a remedy under the Veterans' Benefits Act. Id. at 406-07. Finally, the court approvingly
quoted language from McKay that suggested military pilots face peril as part of their duty. Id.
at 407 (quoting McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984)).
Interestingly, after the NASA Space Shuttle Challenger disaster, the government moved to
compensate a member of the Challenger crew who was on active duty status at the time of the
tragedy in spite of the Feres doctrine. In response, one aerospace industry periodical commented
editorially that the risks encountered by astronauts are not greater than those faced by military
pilots. See Justice For All, AWATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., July 4, 1988, at 7.
121. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 408. The court stated that if contractors were to be held liable they
would not participate to the same extent in design efforts or research and development and that
they would be forced to increase prices. Because of the need to encourage contractor participation,
the court set the minimal level for government approval as "more than a rubber stamp." Id.
However, the Third Circuit approval standard stems from a process not merely more than a
rubber stamp, but affirmatively inclusive of the "back and forth" or "substantial review" involved
in the Third Circuit's cases. See In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on 9/11/82,
769 F.2d 115, 124 n.10 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
122. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 409 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897
(1988). The court concluded that the reasons for the defense concerned "the threat of liability
for government-approved technology, not . . . the particular theory of liability." Id.
123. Id. at 409 n.3.
124. See Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
125. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988). The Second Circuit endorsed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, but impliedly
affirmed the district court's modified form of the government contractor defense as well. Id. at
192.
126. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 843-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). The chemical companies settled the
claims for $180 million. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 148-52
("Overview and Summary of Rulings").
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the dangers of Agent Orange as the defendants. 27 Moreover, the court
elevated the contractors' duty to warn the government 28 above the McKay
standard because the Agent Orange herbicide had been derived from civilian
products, even though it was put to military uses."' The district court then
granted summary judgment against certain plaintiffs, 30 applying both the
127. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 795-99. The court considered the
government contractor defense as one of several possible bars to plaintiffs' recovery. The court
held that the factual problems confronted by the plaintiffs justified approval of the settlement,
in that the government clearly knew at least as much about the dangers of Agent Orange as the
defendants. Id.
128. Id. at 849. The third element of the defense would require a contractor:
[T]o prove (1) that the government knew as much or more than [the] defendant knew
or reasonably should have known about the dangers of [the product] or (2) even if
the government had as much knowledge as [the] defendant should have had, it would
have ordered production of [the product] in any event and would not have taken
steps to reduce or eliminate the hazard.
Id. The court stated four lines of analysis to support its modified version of the government
contractor defense. First, the court stated that the defense supplies a standard of conduct, rather
than a particular defense to a specific theory of liability such as negligence or strict liability. Id.
at 843. Second, contractors were compelled to produce Agent Orange under the Defense Production
Act, which did not preclude contractor liability stemming from compliance. Id. at 845. Third, the
court reiterated its analysis of the choice of law issue, concluding that federal interests required
that the defense be controlled by federal law. Id. at 846-47.
The final portion of the analysis questioned whether a "knew or should have known" standard
would be applied to the third element of the defense. The court looked to the nature of the
contractors' product involvement, whereby they had taken two civilian chemical components and
combined them to produce the herbicide. Thus the defendants could be held to have significant
familiarity with the product. They were, however, compelled to produce the product which was
then used in concentrations and under conditions over which they had no control. The higher
duty to warn standard was aimed at balancing the contractors' years of experience against the
context of wartime production and use. The standard ensured that where a "highly technical
product with which a manufacturer has had years of experience and which allegedly caused damage
unprecedented in its magnitude," the contractor would have reason to increase its knowledge. Id.
at 849 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 848. Because the contractors had learned about the product from their civilian
experience, they were held to a "knew or should have known" standard under the duty to warn
element of the defense. But the primary formulation of the defense, set forth in McKay v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984), requires
only that the contractor warn the government of known defects. The district court justified its
elevated warning standard by describing the product intended to be governed by the McKay
standard as one with a primarily military application. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F.
Supp. at 848. Other cases, the court said, had involved civilian products specifically modified for
use by the military, with the modification resulting in injury. See, e.g., Casabianca v. Casabianca,
104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (injury resulting from use of a pizza
mixer originally built to military specifications). Here, the contractors' years of experience were
such as to justify a higher duty to warn. The court altered the standard in the context of legal
barriers justifying approval of settlement of class actions. See In re Agent Orange Opt-Out
Opinion, 611 F. Supp 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
130. Id. at 1263. The plaintiffs had opted out of the class action. The court also granted
summary judgment against an individual plaintiff who had opted out of the class. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Lilley v. Dow Chem. Co.), 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
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government contractor defense and the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA.' 31 The court's ruling, which was based on the modified govern-
ment contractor defense it had delineated previously, 3 2 was the only opinion
in the litigation that applied the defense to the facts,' 33 and it was affirmed
by the Second Circuit. 14 The court of appeals relied expressly on the
"military contractor defense,"' 3 5 and held that because the government's
knowledge was at least equal to that of the contractors, the defendants
had warned the government adequately. 13 6 The appellate court noted that
absent proof that Agent Orange had caused injury, the contractors could
not have breached a duty to inform the government of risks.'
3 7
3. The Third Circuit's Hybrid Approach
McKay has been widely cited as the seminal case on the government
contractor defense, 3 ' but nonetheless it has been open to differing inter-
pretations. The Third Circuit merged the Agent Orange II and McKay
analyses of the government contractor defense and focused on the con-
tractor's interaction with the government in generating specifications and
131. Agent Orange Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F. Supp. at 1263-64. The court concluded that the
government, in its discretion, would have decided to use Agent Orange even if it had known more
about the possible risks. The discretionary function exception of the FTCA protected the govern-
ment's balancing of risks and benefits. The court deemed the health risks to have been insufficient
to bar use of defoliant to protect troops. Id. See also Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108
S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988) (discretionary function exception key to Supreme Court's analysis of
government contractor defense).
132. See Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
133. Agent Orange Opt-Out Opinion, 611 F. Supp. at 1263. The court found that the government
knew at least as much, if not more than the contractors about the risks involved in the use of
the herbicide. Id. The court also relied on two alternative dispositive grounds: plaintiffs could
neither prove that Agent Orange had caused any particular harm nor trace alleged injuries to
Agent Orange produced by a particular defendant. Id. at 1260-63. Other than granting the
summary judgment against the opt-out plaintiffs, the district court's contemporaneous decisions
did not depend on the government contractor defense.
134. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
135. Id. In Tozer, the Fourth Circuit applied the government contractor defense particularly to
military contractors, Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2897 (1988), and that focus led to the recognition of a "military" as opposed to "government"
contractor defense. Following Tozer, the Second Circuit grounded the military contractor defense
on its concern for the separation of powers and military procurement. In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 191.
136. Id. at 193-94.
137. Id. at 192-93. The court's post hoc analysis is unique among cases involving the government
contractor defense. Its argument stated that because there was no proof that Agent Orange posed
any hazard, the contractors could not have had any duty to warn the government. Id. at 193.
The Second Circuit, however, left open the question of whether the modified defense should have
been recognized at all because it held that the contractors had established the defense under either
standard. Id. at 192.
138. See supra notes 100-37 and accompanying text.
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the process by which those specifications received the government's ap-
proval. 3 9 Although the formulation of the defense in McKay was clearly
linked to the Feres doctrine, that limiting element did not resolve interpre-
tive questions about the other elements. 4 ' To the Third Circuit, the most
critical question focused on the impact a contractor's participation in
creating specifications would have on its assertion of the defense.
14 1
Even if a contractor's participation in the design process did not preclude
assertion of the defense, the contractor might lose the defense if it had
developed the specifications and the government had approved them after
only pro forma review. 42 The Third Circuit addressed this scenario in
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol. 14 There, the issue concerned whether the
139. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982). The Third Circuit expressed
its approval of the Agent Orange II test as a matter of Pennsylvania law in a diversity action.
Plaintiff was a serviceman who had been injured while operating a bulldozer manufactured by
defendant. Id. at 247. The district court had granted the defendant summary judgment on the
grounds that compliance with specifications precluded liability for design defects. Brown v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 554 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir.
1982). The court of appeals reversed, noting in dicta that if it had been able to restate the test
for the government contractor defense it would have required a showing that the contractor had
been compelled to produce the required a showing that the contractor had been compelled to
produce the government's design. Brown, 696 F.2d at 254 & n.17.
140. See Hubbs v. United Technologies, 574 F. Supp. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing Koutsoubos
v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985), and Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.
1982)). Plaintiffs, whose decedents were killed in the crash of a naval reserve helicopter, sued
under a theory of strict liability and alleged that a defect in the design of a control system caused
the mishap. Hubbs, 574 F. Supp. at 97. The court denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment, premising its analysis on the elements framed by the Agent Orange II court. Id. at 98.
Because the defendant had not shown that the government had provided detailed, rather than
performance specifications, it had not foreclosed a factual dispute as to whether the government
had established the specifications. The court read this first element to require only that "the
product . . . supplied was a particular product specified by the government." Id. at 99 (quoting
Agent Orange 11, 534 F. Supp. at 1056). That burden, in the district court's view, was synonymous
with the McKay version of the first element-that the government established or approved
reasonably precise specifications. Id. The court also quoted McKay for its Feres doctrine analysis
to justify the defense. Id. at 98.
141. See id. at 100. The district court followed the Agent Orange II reasoning that contractor
participation in creating the specifications would not make the defense unavailable. Id. Rather,
interplay between the government and a contractor affected the relative level of both participants'
knowledge, which constitutes the third element of the defense. Id.
142. See, e.g., Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[I]f any
involvement by the contractor would defeat the defense, there would be no incentive for contractors
to work closely with the military; on the other hand, where there is no government participation
in the preparation of specifications the rationales for the defense do not apply.") (emphasis in
original), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985).
143. 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). Because the action was
brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
federal law applied. The Third Circuit noted both the Agent Orange II and McKay approaches
and followed the former, for actions involving products that had been developed specially for the
military. Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
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district court144 had correctly ruled that contractual specifications, either
established or approved by the government, satisfied the defense's first
element. 45 In affirming the court below, the Third Circuit held that the
defense set forth in Agent Orange II allowed government approval of
specifications developed by a contractor, notwithstanding that the govern-
ment had not controlled or compelled the design. 46 Yet, because mere
government approval was insufficient to set up the "established or ap-
proved" element, the scope of the requisite government approval remained
unsettled. 141
The Third Circuit focused on contractor participation in interpreting the
Agent Orange II standard in In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim Ger-
many on 9/11/82 [hereinafter Air Crash at Mannheim]. 4s The Army had
supplied the contractor with performance specifications and subsequently
approved the contractor's detailed design. 49 The trial court certified to the
Third Circuit the question, under Pennsylvania law, of its extent to which
contractor participation in developing a design that later received govern-
ment approval precluded the contractor's assertion of the defense.5 0
144. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 553 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 755 F.2d 352 (3d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985). The district court applied the McKay version of the
first element and granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on the first two
elements of the defense. Id. at 343-44. After an evidentiary hearing regarding the third element,
the trial court entered judgment for the defendant. Koulsoubos, 755 F.2d at 354.
145. Koutsoubos, 755 F.2d at 355.
146. Id. The Third Circuit relied on the finding below that the Navy and the contractor had
engaged in a "continuous back-and-forth" discussion, with the Navy having final authority.
Because there was adequate Navy participation to show that the government had established the
specifications, the court affirmed judgment for the defendant. Id. at 355.
147. Id. ("Where there is no government participation in the preparation of specifications the
rationales for the defense do not apply."). See Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359 (E.D.
Pa. 1985). A municipal firefighter sued the manufacturer of protective clothing and gloves which
had failed to prevent him from suffering burns. Id. at 1360. The defendant moved for summary
judgment, relying on the government contractor defense. Id. The court held that the contractor
had failed to establish that the detailed specifications had "originated with the government." Id.
at 1363. The court relied on Koutsoubos, which held that government approval, by itself, did not
show that the government had established specifications, and held that the government must play
a significant role in establishing the specifications. Id. For a discussion of cases where the
government contractor defense was asserted against claims involving allegedly defective civilian
products, see infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
148. 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Air Crash at Mannheim], cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1082 (1986). Plaintiffs were British, French, and German parachutists killed in the crash of a U.S.
Army CH-47C helicopter that had been manufactured by Boeing's Vertol Division in Pennsylvania.
Id. at 118. The actions were brought on state law negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability
theories. Id. at 119.
149. In re Air Crash Disaster at Mannheim, Germany on 9/11/82, 586 F. Supp. 711, 717 (E.D.
Pa. 1984), rev'd, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986). The district
court ruled that the defendant had not established the government contractor defense and therefore
denied its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
150. Air Crash at Mannheim, 769 F.2d at 120. The Third Circuit's review was limited to the
certified issue of the applicability of the government contractor defense under Pennsylvania law.
Id. at 120 & nn.6-7.
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The Third Circuit followed its decision in Koutsoubos, which was grounded
on approval of specifications after continuous negotiations between the
government and the contractor.' The first element of the defense was met
if the government established specifications or if the government's review
of the design specifications was substantial, but not if that review was
merely a rubber stamp.5 2 Thus, the hybrid of Agent Orange II and McKay
examines the government's asserted review of a proposed design more
closely before finding that the government established or approved the
specifications.
4. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.
The Eleventh Circuit employed a different analytic focus and arrived at
a substantially different formulation of the government contractor defense
in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.'53 The court emphasized the con-
stitutional separation of powers in support of the defense.1 4 Deriving a
test that would match this interest, the court ruled that the defense requires
the contractor to avoid participation in the government's design process or
to fulfill a duty to warn the government and to proceed only after receiving
151. Id. at 122-23. Because the court described the inquiry as testing whether the government
had truly participated in the development of the specifications, the holding in Air Crash at
Mannheim is part of the Agent Orange 11 line of cases. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit cited
McKay in support of its analysis, noting that the Ninth Circuit had remanded the issue of whether
the government had "set or approved reasonably-detailed specifications." Id. at 122 n.9 (quoting
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984)).
152. Id. at 122-23. The court ruled that the government's review had been sufficient to constitute
approval of the contractor's design. The court based its ruling on contract clauses which incor-
porated the specifications and controlled any proposed engineering changes, and on tests which
the Army had performed. Id. at 123-24.
153. 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). The district court
ruled that the government contractor defense did not protect Grumman from liability because the
design factors at issue were less dependent on military expertise than the design in McKay had
been and because the contractor had exercised broad discretion over the design. Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1066, 1074 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
Interestingly, the Supreme Court opted to deny certiorari rather than vacating and remanding
Shaw for reconsideration in light of Boyle, which held that federal law displaced state law in
cases involving the government contractor defense and military equipment. Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988). Shaw was brought as a federal cause of action
under the Death on the High Seas Act. Shaw, 593 F. Supp. at 1067. Therefore, a possible
explanation is that the Court intended that the government contractor defense formulated in Boyle
apply to actions arising under federal as well as state law.
154. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 743. The court acknowledged that the military contractor defense
shielded from judicial scrutiny "military risk taking-where it involves products supplied by
contractors-"under the theory of separation of powers, "provided only that [the risk-taking] is
knowing and useful." Id.
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the government's informed approval.'" Thus, the defense would apply only
where the design decision for which liability is sought to be imposed was
truly a governmental decision.
5 6
The Eleventh Circuit did not find the Ninth Circuit's policy reasons
articulated in McKay to conclusively establish the government contractor
defense. First, the court read the Feres-Stencel doctrine more narrowly,
rejecting the argument that contractors would simply pass the cost of
liability on to the government.' Second, the court relied instead on the
Supreme Court's then most recent statement in United States v. Shearer's
that the policy goals of Feres were to protect military decisions and
discipline.5 9 The court gave little weight to the remaining McKay policy
arguments. 60 The effect of liability on contractors' ability to take risks
and to participate in the design process was, in the Shaw court's view,
insufficient to justify the defense.' 6' Although the Boyle Court rejected
Shaw's statement of the defense's elements, the Eleventh Circuit's approach
to the defense's policy goals did gain at least implicit approval. 162
By the time the Supreme Court decided Boyle, five different versions of
the government contractor defense had emerged: the initial statement of
the elements in Agent Orange I,1 63 the widely followed McKay formula-
tion,164 the Third Circuit's decisions keyed to the process by which speci-
fications were established or approved,' 65 the Eleventh Circuit's focus on
the separation of powers, 66 and the modified In re "Agent Orange"
Products Liability Litigation defense that imposed a more stringent warning
duty upon the contractor. 67 Before considering the Supreme Court's de-
155. Id. at 746. The defense would bar suit only if the contractor could prove: (1) its role in
designing the defective equipment was minimal or (2) it timely warned the government of the risks
of the design and informed it of reasonably known design alternatives, and the government,
"although forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design."
Id. The court delineated between two types of specifications, the first comprising precise details
of a particular product and the other stating performance or mission goals. Id. at 745. Contractors
would be liable only for designs involving the first type of specifications. Id.
156. Id. at 746.
157. Id. at 741-42.
158. 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
159. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 742 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985)).
160. Id. at 743.
161. Id.
162. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (basing military contractor
defense on separation of powers and protecting military procurement process), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
163. 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
164. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
165. See Air Crash at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082
(1986).
166. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2896 (1988).
167. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
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cision on the defense itself, this Note next turns to a brief discussion of
the choice of law principles that formed the context for Boyle v. United
Technologies Corp.'6
D. Choice of Law
Regardless of the elements necessary to establish the government con-
tractor defense, the defense itself raises choice of law issues. Recently,
courts have paid significant attention to whether federal or state law
controls the issues of the government contractor defense. A choice of law
issue is presented because the relationship between the government and
members of the military implicates federal interests; tort claims, however,
are governed by state law. 69 It is therefore necessary to consider the
principles that control the preemption of state law and the application of
federal common law.
Since Justice Brandies wrote that "[tihere is no federal general common
law," 10 there have nonetheless been areas where federal common law has
applied. 7 These areas are not limited to those where the Constitution or
a federal statute govern. Nevertheless, absent important federal interests,
the federal courts lack authority to create federal common law in diversity
actions. In contrast, where the action is brought pursuant to a federal
statute, such as the Death on the High Seas Act ("DOHSA"), 7 2 the statute
confers jurisdiction and the applicable law is federal. 73 Therefore, with
respect to the government contractor defense, the issue is whether particular
federal interests justify the displacement of state law with federal common
law.
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). There were two modifications to the
contractor's burden in establishing the defense. First, the contractor's knowledge was to be
measured by an objective standard, which required that the government's knowledge at least be
equal to that which the contractor should reasonably have possessed. Id. In the alternative, the
contractor could show that even with the requisite knowledge, the government would have ordered
production without trying to reduce its risks. Id.
168. 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). Under the FTCA, in instances where the government has
consented to be sued, "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" applies to the
action. Id.
170. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The Erie doctrine requires a federal
court sitting ina diversity action to apply the conflicts rules of the state in which it sits. Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
171. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal government's
rights and duties with respect to its commercial paper are matters controlled by federal, not state
law). But see Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956)
("litigation [was] purely between private parties and [did] not touch the rights and duties of the
United States").
172. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. V 1987),
173. If there is no federal statutory provision covering an issue, the choice of law question is
whether federal law controls (and is applicable in all courts, both state and federal), or whether
state law controls (which under the Erie doctrine is applicable in all courts as well). See R.
WEINSTEIN, COMMENTARY ON THE CHOICE OF LAW 614 (2d ed. 1983).
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The-standard for determining whether federal law controls a particular
issue depends on finding sufficient federal interest in reaching uniform
national results under a federal rule. 74 Where the interests of the United
States are directly involved in the litigation, for example, the need for
uniformity mandates the application of federal rules of decision.' 75 The
Supreme Court has held, however, that absent congressional authority to
create substantive law, federal common law applies to only a few narrow
areas. 76 The federal government's interest in its rights and obligations
under its contracts is one area that the Supreme Court has recognized as
satisfying the test for preemption of state law.'77 In short, the test to
determine whether state law is preempted considers the federal interest in
a particular area together with the conflict between federal interests and
state law. 78
The Agent Orange litigation played an early role in resolving whether
state or federal law applies to the government contractor defense. In
reversing the district court's ruling that federal law applied to the plaintiffs'
claims, the Second Circuit left open the question of which law governed
the defense. 79 The Second Circuit's holding that federal law was inappli-
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (federal common
law applies to "the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty
cases.").
177. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592-94 (1973).
178. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 31 (1977). The Court stated:
In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the
guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
and the use of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown.
Id. (emphasis added by Miree Court) (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
The Second Circuit extrapolated the test into the following elements: "(1) the existence of a
substantial federal interest in the outcome of a litigation; (2) the effect on this federal interest
should state law be applied; and (3) the effect on state interests should state law be displaced by
federal common law." In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Accord Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 568 (5th
Cir. 1985). However, the court emphasized that in considering the first factor (the federal interest),
the government must be a party to the suit and must have an interest (1) in uniform rules
governing its rights and (2) in the substantive contents of those uniform rules. See In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d at 993.
179. See In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 n.2 (Second Circuit earlier
reached the issue of whether federal interest was present only for purpose of establishing subject
matter jurisdiction, so question of federal interest in government contractor defense reserved)
(citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (1981)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1067 (1984). The district court ruled that federal law
applied to the plaintiffs' claims for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction. The court held
that although the federal government was not a party to the action, the preemption test set forth
in Miree was satisfied. See Agent Orange I, 506 F. Supp. 762, 744 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, on other
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cable to the plaintiffs' claims did not compel the choice of state law. On
remand, the district court subsequently relied instead on a national con-
sensus law that it believed the states would have chosen to apply.180 The
district court found that the government contractor defense implicated
significant federal interests, 8' notwithstanding the federal interest in com-
pensation for injured servicemen.
grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
The Second Circuit reversed and held that there was no identifiable federal interest threatened
by the application of state law. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987, 993 (2d
Cir. 1980). Furthermore, it distinguished actions in which the United States was itself a party and
therefore had interests in uniformity for its own sake, see, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 32-34 (1956) (issue of whether government bonds were "overdue"
in private litigation a matter of federal law; issue of defendant's good faith in taking title a matter
of local law), as well as in the substantive content of the uniform rules, see, e.g., United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947) (relationship between government and members of
Armed Forces is distinctively federal in character; Supreme Court recognized need for uniformity
but did not impose substantive liability sought by United States). In re Agent Orange, 635 F.2d
at 993.
Here, the federal government had interests in both the welfare of its veterans and its relations
with defense contractors. Id. at 994. But neither of these interests were content-neutral, and the
court held that it was unable to identify a federal policy that reconciled them. Id. at 994-95.
Congressional inaction in articulating an "identifiable" policy with respect to the claims asserted
at the district court level was the Second Circuit's reason for ruling that the lower court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 995.
180. The Second Circuit had held that federal law did not apply to the plaintiffs' claims and
that therefore jurisdiction was based only on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 993. Nevertheless, the
choice of federal law to apply to the issue of the government contractor defense was expressly
left open. See In re Diamond Shamrock, 725 F.2d at 861 n.2.
The district court reviewed two issues, beginning with whether the government contractor defense
applied to actions in strict liability; the court held the defense to be so applicable. In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 701-02 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Second, the court looked
to specific interests of the federal government sufficient to preempt rules of state law. Id. at 703-
04. One such interest was the need for uniformity in the law applicable to the government
contractor defense. Id.
Although the Supreme Court deemed it unnecessary in Boyle to cite earlier determinations
concerning the applicability of federal law to issues of the government contractor defense, the
district court opinion would have provided strong support for the Court's analysis. The district
court distinguished prior rulings on the government contractor defense under state law on the
basis that those decisions either involved nonmilitary products used by civilians many years after
their production for the government or manufacturing defects in airplanes and explosives-the
type of defects frequently regulated by state law. Id. at 712. Moreover, the government contractor
defense cannot be established where the defect was one of manufacture rather than design. See
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043
(1984).
181. Nevertheless, when the Third Circuit considered the choice of law issue with respect to
the government contractor defense, it held that the logical underpinnings of the Feres-Stencel
doctrine were insufficient to cause state law to be displaced. Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
696 F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1982). The court of appeals reasoned that while the fortuity of
where an alleged tort occurred could not affect the liability of the government, manufacturers
were presently liable under differing state standards of liability. Id. at 248-49. The court did not
find any threat to military discipline in a suit against a contractor as such actions would not
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Courts confronted the question of whether state or federal law applied
to the government contractor defense in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision
in McKay v. Rockwell International Corp.'S2 The Fifth Circuit' 83 correctly
anticipated the Supreme Court's choice of law analysis in Boyle, specifically
noting that the McKay standard "substantially reflects the pertinent federal
interests.'' 4 Further, in McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft,"5 the California
Court of Appeal stated that because the relation between the government
and servicemen is defined and governed by federal sources of authority,
the law governing interference with that relationship must also be federal.
The court held that the three requisites for the displacement of state law
were satisfied. 86
In its relatively brief appearance as a matter of decisional law, the
government contractor defense raised two issues sufficiently significant for
Supreme Court review. The Court had to decide not only which formulation
of the defense to endorse, but had to do so in the context of applying
federal common law to state causes of action.
require military decisions to be second-guessed. Id. Contra Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556,
569, 570 & n.17 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal interests justify the government contractor defense as a
matter of federal law).
The Third Circuit relied on Agent Orange , 696 F.2d at 249 n.6, as well as earlier cases in
which state law was applied to the defense. Id. at 249 n.5 (citing Foster v. Day & Zimmerman,
Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974); Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1969); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 335
F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
182. 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). McKay was brought
under DOHSA and jurisdiction was in admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
183. Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). Significantly, for purposes of
analyzing Boyle, the Fifth Circuit engaged in a thorough review of the question of whether federal
law should displace state law with regard to the defense. Id. at 567-74. The court held that federal
interests mandated that federal common law control adjudication of the defense. Id. at 574. Based
on the Feres-Stencel doctrine, the court found uniquely federal interests sufficient to justify
displacement of state law. Id. at 568-71. In examining the conflict with state law, the court noted
that "a clear majority" of courts had adopted the defense under state law. Id. at 571.
184. Id. at 574.
185. 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983). The action arose from the crash of a
Navy helicopter caused by a defective control system.
186. The test is derived from Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) and Wallis v. Pan
American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966). See supra note 178. The court disagreed with the
Second Circuit and stated that "torts committed by [a] military aircraft manufacturer against
active duty military personnel" implicated substantial federal interests. McLaughlin, 148 Cal. App.
3d at 211, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768. Cf. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987,
994-95 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal interest not sufficient for district court to have subject matter
jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Second, applying state law would burden federal
interests because state decisions would lack uniformity and hence predictability. McLaughlin, 148
Cal. App. 3d at 211, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768. As to the third prong of the Miree test, the court
noted that California law could not be held to be displaced by the application of federal law
because the government contractor defense had not yet been the subject of state court decisions.
148 Cal. App. 3d at 211-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
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A. Facts
During a training mission off the Virginia coast, the Marine Corps
helicopter in which Lt. Boyle was the copilot crashed after an apparent
control system malfunction. The three other crew members escaped under-
water after impact, but Lt. Boyle was unable to do So.'8 7 Lt. Boyle's father
filed suit against the helicopter's manufacturer, alleging that the crew
compartment was defectively designed in that the copilot's access to the
escape hatch handle was blocked. Further, plaintiff alleged that the hatch
had been defectively designed because it opened outward and against water
pressure when submerged."' The jury awarded the plaintiff damages, and
the defendant manufacturer appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed, relying on the strength of the "military
contractor defense" it had recognized earlier that day in Tozer v. LTV
Corp.S9 Applying the defense in Boyle, the Fourth Circuit emphasized two
arguments. First, the contractor and the government had exchanged suf-
ficient information "to establish government approval of the design in
question."'' 90 Further, because the Navy inspected a mock-up of the cockpit,
the defendant showed that the Navy had approved reasonably precise
specifications. 19' Plaintiff sought review in the Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari. 192
B. Majority Opinion
1. Choice of Law
A major part of the Court's opinion deals with whether federal common
law displaces state law with respect to the military contractor defense. In
reaching an affirmative answer, Justice Scalia's opinion for the 5-4 majority
first stated the basic preemption principle: 93 state law cannot be displaced
187. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513.
188. Id. The jury awarded the plaintiff damages based on this claim, but not on his claim that
the defendant had caused the mishap through negligent repair of the aircraft's flight control
system.
189. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988). Tozer focused on the
constitutional separation of powers and the need to protect the integrity of military procurement
as reasons for the government contractor defense. See supra notes 117 and 120-23 and accom-
panying text.
190. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 792 F.2d 413, 414 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988).
191. Id.
192. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 479 U.S. 1029 (1986).
193. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513-14. For a discussion of these choice of law principles, see supra
notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
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absent a clear statutory prescription or a direct conflict between state and
federal law. 194
In the first portion of its preemption analysis, the Court looked to
uniquely federal interests that might justify the application of federal
common law.195 The majority provided two analogues to the federal interest
asserted in Boyle: 96 the obligations and rights of the United States under
contract 197 and the immunity of federal officials for actions taken in the
course of their duty. 198 Justice Scalia relied on Yearsley v. W. A. Ross
Construction Co., 199 to support the argument that military procurement
contracts implicate uniquely federal interests.200 The Court majority found
no reason to distinguish between performance and procurement contracts.
Although the United States was not a party to a suit in which the contractor
defense had been invoked, the Court still found critical interests were
implicated: the federal treasury, as well as procurement itself.20'
The next portion of the preemption analysis was concerned with defining
the requisite conflict with state law. Beyond the presence of uniquely federal
interests, the displacement of state law also requires a conflict between
state and federal law.2 0 2 To show what level of conflict would support
preemption of state law, the Court drew a continuum along which it
identified three types of cases. First, if the subject of the suit involved the
enforcement of the contractual duty itself, state law would control the
case. 203 Second, an intermediate situation would involve a state law duty
to include a certain safety feature which was not required by the contract
194. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513-14.
195. Id.
196. The federal interest at stake in Boyle involved military procurement. Id. at 2514.
197. Id. This federal interest was recognized, according to the majority, in United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
198. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514 (citing Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988)). This second
interest provoked an exchange with the dissenting Justices, who claimed that the majority was
extending either the interest underlying the immunity or the immunity itself. Compare id. at 2514
n. 1 (Court merely drew analogy to official immunity) with id. at 2524 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(majority opinion extended the immunity itself to contractors).
199. 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (origin of "government contract defense").
200. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514-15.
201, Id. at 2515 ("The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect
the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design
specified by the Government, or it will raise its price."). Accord Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United
States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965) (contractors' cost increases will be passed on to
government). The Court thus distinguished the result in Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25
(1977), in which the federal interest was too insignificant to justify federal preemption. Boyle,
108 S. Ct. at 2515.
202. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2515 (citing Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,
68 (1966) and United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979)).
203. Id. at 2516. See also Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977) (third party beneficiary
of contract with government sought to enforce contractual duty of person contracting with
government).
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 39:825
but also not contrary to the government specifications. State law would
govern this type of case as well. 20 4
Boyle exemplified the third type of case: the duty sought to be imposed
was in fact directly contrary to the defendant's contract with the govern-
ment. But, the Court stated, Boyle still might not have involved sufficient
conflict with federal law, if the government had failed to show that it had
a significant interest in the feature in question.2 0 5 To the extent that the
government had merely received what it had ordered, the federal interest
was too insignificant to justify the preemption of state law. 20 6 In sum, the
government's interest in procurement contracts conflicted with state law
for preemption purposes only where the state law duty was contrary to the
contract and where the government showed that it had an interest in the
particular feature or item. 20 7
In the third section of the preemption analysis, the Court articulated the
principle that limits and defines the scope of conflict between federal and
state law. Although recognizing that the circuit courts relied on Feres as
the source of the "significant conflict" necessary to preempt state law, 2 0
the Court nevertheless rejected Feres for choice of law purposes and relied
on logic, rather than precedent, to find that the doctrine produced unduly
broad results. 20 9 Likewise, the Feres doctrine produced results that were
204. The Court hypothesized a government order for an air conditioner based on performance
specifications "but not the precise manner of construction." Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. This
example concerns performance specifications, generally insufficient to establish the defense in any
event. See Agent Orange 11, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
205. The Court was referring to the escape-hatch that the plaintiff claimed was necessary as
opposed to the type shown by specifications. The majority opinion provided an example which
involved an order for a stock helicopter that happens to have a certain type of hatch. The Court
stated that "it is impossible" to find a significant government interest in that feature. Boyle, 108
S. Ct. at 2516.
206. The Court stated that any other result would be unreasonable based on a comparison to
the standard products liability doctrine. Id.
207. Id. at 2516.
208. Id. at 2517. Yet the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits had discussed Feres in terms of
the policies underlying the defense, such as preventing contractors from transferring costs to the
government, and not to support federal preemption of state law. Id.
Only one of the four opinions cited by the majority discussed the Feres-Stencel doctrine as part
of a preemption analysis. Compare Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1985)
(Feres as federal interest justifying displacement of state law) with Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d
403, 408 (4th Cir. 1986) (reason to adopt defense was to prevent cost increases from affecting
procurement), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988) and Tillet v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-
97 (7th Cir. 1985) (reasons for extending Feres immunity to contractors) and McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (9th Cir. 1983) (reasons supporting defense parallel policies
supporting Feres), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). While the policies supporting the government
contractor defense, and the federal interest underlying preemption of state law may be very similar,
the decisions prior to Boyle, except for Bynum, were not primarily concerned with the choice of
law issue.
209. The majority illustrated its belief that Feres would produce results which were too broad.
For example, the Court found that a serviceman not only would be prohibited from suing the
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overly narrow in that it would not prevent civilians from suing the gov-
ernment for allegedly harmful noise from jet fighter engines. In this
hypothetical, the Court stated that the subject should not be regulated by
state law. Therefore, the majority rejected Feres as a principle defining the
conflict between the federal interest in procurement contracts and state
law. 2 0
Instead, the Court found that the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA2' limits and defines the scope of significant conflict between
the federal government's interest in procurement and state law. The Boyle
majority viewed design choices as "assuredly" discretionary functions. 22
The design process required engineering analysis and the balancing of
several factors, particularly safety against mission effectiveness.2t3 Any
second-guessing of these choices would subvert the purpose of the discre-
tionary function exception because contractors would pass on to the gov-
ernment the costs of liability or insurance. 21 4
To summarize the Court's choice of law analysis, Boyle concluded that
federal law governed the issues of the government contractor defense after
conducting a three-part analysis. The federal government had unique in-
terests in contracts for procurement of military equipment. Where the
contractor's duty to the government was contrary to the burdens sought
to be imposed under state law (in Boyle, state tort law), federal common
law displaced the state law. Finally, the discretionary function exception,
rather than the Feres doctrine, provided the analytic key to finding the
precise conflict in a particular controversy.
2. Elements of the Government Contractor Defense
The Boyle Court adopted the Ninth Circuit's formulation of the govern-
ment contractor defense. 215 The Court linked the first two elements, that
the government established or approved reasonably precise specifications
and that the product complied with the specifications, to the assurance
that a discretionary function had actually been involved. 2 6 The third
government for injuries suffered, but also would be prohibited from suing a manufacturer of
equipment that was purchased solely from the manufacturer's stock and was not specially ordered.
The Court intended this example to show an insufficient predicate for federal preemption of state
law. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
210. Id.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
212. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517.
213. Id. (discretion involved in design of military equipment "includ[es] specifically the trade-
off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness").
214. Id. at 2518.
215. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 (citing with approval McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d
444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)). The Court did change the McKay
test to the extent of deleting the requirement that the government be immune from suit under the
Feres doctrine in order for the government contractor defense to apply.
216. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. The majority related the specification elements to assurance
that the particular feature was reviewed by a government officer and not merely by the contractor.
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element, that the contractor informed the government of risks known to
the contractor but not to the government, provided incentives for contrac-
tors to identify risks. The Court sought to avoid impeding discretionary
functions by disrupting the flow of information needed by decisionmak-
ers. 2 17 The Court vacated the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded
the case, because it was unclear whether the court of appeals held that no
reasonable jury could have found against the contractor, or instead, it had
weighed the facts on its own, upon applying a different test for the defense
than that employed by the district court.2 1 1
C. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which he attempted to refute
sequentially each of the majority's arguments . 2 9 The dissent stated nar-
rower preemption principles than those relied upon by the majority and
argued against the displacement of state law, taking issue with the premises
of the majority's preemption analysis.
The dissent argued that the federal government's interest in procurement
contracts was not comparable to the other recognized interests underlying
preemption of state law. 20 According to the dissent, the federal govern-
ment's interest in its contractual rights and obligations did not support
preemption because the relationship at issue in Boyle was too far removed
from the government's contract. 22' The dissent also took issue with the
analogy that the majority sought to draw between the federal interest
underlying the immunity of officials for actions taken in the course of
their duty and the government contractor defense. Justice Brennan vigor-
ously disputed extending either the immunity or the interest underlying it
beyond a narrow class of officials. 22 In his view, the federal interest in
procurement contracts was not of the same character as those interests
which had supported the application of federal common law in other areas.
The dissent attempted to distinguish Yearsley and its interpretation by
the majority by arguing that it applied only in the fifth amendment takings
context. 22 The dissent also argued that Yearsley held that a contractor who
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2519. Petitioner had raised a seventh amendment jury trial claim, arguing that his
right had been denied because the court of appeal had indeed weighed the facts.
219. Id. at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined the dissent.
Justice Stevens added a brief dissenting opinion in which he argued that the Court had failed to
"defer to the expertise of Congress." Id. at 2528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id. at 2522 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2523. The dissent read Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), as showing
that the relationship in Boyle between the contractor and a third party was insufficient as a reason
to displace state law. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2523 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 2523-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 2525 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S.
18, 21 (1940)).
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followed government specifications shared in sovereign immunity only if
the contractor served as the government's agent.224 Boyle, however, involved
a contractor who had participated in formulating specifications. 225
In addition to arguing that the federal interests at stake in Boyle were
insufficient to justify displacement of state law, Justice Brennan disagreed
with the majority's position that the FTCA's discretionary function excep-
tion defined the conflict between state and federal law. 226 The dissent argued
that the prospect of cost increases being transferred to the government was
inadequate to justify displacing state law.2 27 Because there was no need to
protect the government from contractors' cost increases before some of
the government's immunity was waived under the FTCA, 228 there was no
need to do so in Boyle. Arguing that Boyle would have been decided
differently if it had been brought as a federal wrongful death cause of
action under DOHSA, the dissent rejected the FTCA as an expression of
federal interest. Instead, the dissent considered the statutory cause of action
as the better indicator of Congress' view of the government's asserted need
for protection from liability.2 2 9
In expressing the view that the Court had taken upon itself a decision
more properly for Congress to make, the dissent also disagreed with an
underlying assumption of the government contractor defense. The dissenters
argued that if the defense was adopted to prevent the government's costs
from increasing, the matter was within Congress' exclusive province. But
the dissent did not accept the premise that tort liability would increase the
government's financial burden. 2 0
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court confronted three issues in Boyle: whether federal
common law displaced state tort law and governed the government con-
224. Id.
225. As to the amount of government review needed to support a finding that the specifications
received approval, see infra notes at 251-59 and accompanying text.
226. The dissent pointed out that counsel for the contractor disclaimed any reliance on the
FTCA's discretionary function exception. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2525 & n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 2526 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing with approval United States v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507, 510 (1954) (FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity for torts of federal employees not a
grant to government of right of indemnity from employee notwithstanding adverse financial impact
upon government)).
228. Id. at 2527 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
229. Id. The statutory action would have been available if the helicopter mishap had occurred
just three miles further offshore. As the dissent recognized, the government contractor defense
had been asserted and indeed approved in DOHSA actions. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792
F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988) (DOHSA action); Shaw v. Grumman
Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) (same);
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984)
(same). Thus, the dissent's argument was that while the government contractor defense is not
authorized by federal statute, the cause of action against which it is asserted is created by such a
statute. Therefore, the cause of action is the better indicator of federal interest. Boyle, 108 S. Ct.
at 2527 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2528 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tractor defense; whether the Feres doctrine or the FTCA's discretionary
function exception defined the conflict between state and federal law for
preemption purposes; and whether the Court should adopt the McKay
formulation of the defense's elements as a matter of federal common law.
With respect to the first two issues concerning the choice of law and scope
of conflict between federal and state law, the Court's analysis was generally
consistent with precedent. But with respect to explaining the elements of
the defense, the Court gave mixed signals as to its view of the issues.
A. Choice of Law
Boyle is significant not only because the Supreme Court adopted McKay's
elements of the government contractor defense, but because it held that
the defense is governed by federal common law.23" ' Most courts that ad-
dressed the contractor defense issue prior to Boyle reached the same
result.232 For example, the Fifth Circuit's choice of law analysis in Bynum
v FMC Corp., which held that uniquely federal interests justified displacing
state law, matched the Supreme Court's analysis in Boyle.233 Even the
dissent's argument in Boyle,234 that the case might have been decided
differently had it been brought under DOHSA, failed to show any incon-
sistency in the Court's choice of law holding.235
231. Id. at 2518.
232. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 409 n.3; Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); McLaughlin v.
Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1983). Contra Brown v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1982) (underpinnings of Feres and Stencel do not justify
application of federal law).
233. A difference between the Fifth Circuit's decision in Bynum and the Supreme Court's
approach in Boyle is that the Fifth Circuit based its ruling, that the government contractor defense
implicates unique federal interests, upon the policy goals of the Feres-Stencel doctrine, namely
preventing second-guessing of military decisions and protecting military discipline. Bynum, 770
F.2d at 570. The court analyzed the impact of federal law upon state law in terms of the policy
reasons justifying strict liability, which it took to be the state's interest. In contrast, the Boyle
Court focused on the federal interest in procurement of military equipment.
234. See Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2527 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that under DOHSA,
federal interest directs that liability be allowed against contractor).
235. DOHSA, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The majority refused to join issue with
the dissent over the question of whether the outcome of the case would be different if the suit
had been brought under the statute. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 n.5. Analysis shows that the federal
interests that justify the defense are consistent with those interests which underlay the statutory
cause of action. It is therefore unlikely that Boyle-as a DOHSA suit-would have produced a
different choice of law holding.
First, because DOHSA actions are brought in admiralty, federal law would apply of its own
force. The policy reasons for the defense-for example, the need to prevent contractors' costs
from being passed on to the government or the need to insulate military decisions from second-
guessing-are equally applicable to such actions. In fact, the government contractor defense gained
recognition in DOHSA actions. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). Accord Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2527 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Second, the fact that Boyle itself could not have been brought under DOHSA does not change
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The policy reasons that support the defense and the interests of the
federal government warranting the preemption of state law are at least
closely related, if not identical.23 6 The Boyle Court's choice of law analysis
of the defense, which relied heavily on the need for the defense to prevent
adverse cost impact upon the government from contractor liability, thus
reiterated in part the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in McKay.231 Indeed, the
district court's rulings in the later stages of the Agent Orange litigation
the choice of law holding. The strongest argument to be made for looking to the statute in
deciding which law applies is that the federal interest cannot be identified. In particular, both
compensation to injured servicemen, and the protection of discretionary functions and military
decisions would be implicated in the same lawsuit. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig.,
635 F.2d 987, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1980) (diffusion of federal interests where both compensation to
injured veterans and protection of defense contractors implicated requires application of state
law), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). Yet, the Second Circuit held only that federal interests
were insufficient to establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. As that court later noted, the
question of federal law applying to issues of the contractor defense was not resolved in its earlier
decision. In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 861 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1067 (1984). And, the court later clearly endorsed the holding that federal law applies
to the defense. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988).
Finally, the Boyle Court expressly rejected the formulation of the defense from Shaw v.
Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (DOHSA action), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2896 (1988), a case with a petition for certiorari then pending. Given the holding in Boyle, it
would have been consistent for the Court to have accepted the certiorari petition with the'Court
vacating and remanding Shaw for reconsideration in light of Boyle. Yet, the petition was denied.
Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Shaw, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). While Shaw itself stands, because
the Court did not remand the case for reconsideration, the implication is that the military contractor
defense is intended to apply to federal DOHSA actions as well as to state law claims.
236. See, e.g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 569 (5th Cir. 1985) (federal interest
justifying preemption of state law coextensive with policy of Feres doctrine to prevent second-
guessing of military decisions in general and impairment of discipline). Cf. Tozer v. LTV Corp.,
792 F.2d 403, 405-08 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988) (constitutional separation
of powers concerns and protecting military procurement warrant military contractor defense).
237. Compare Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988) (defense
needed to prevent increased costs as reason for preemption) with McKay, 704 F.2d at 449 (first
of four policy reasons in support of defense is need to prevent increased costs of liability from
being passed on to government). Compare Bynum, 770 F.2d at 570 (Feres-Stencel policies regarding
military decisions and discipline support preemption) with McKay, 704 F.2d at 449 (need to protect
military decisions and discipline as policy concern).
The notion that a government contractor defense in some form protects the government's
coffers was present in the earliest decisions, e.g., Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S.
18, 21 (1940), and in cases leading up to recent developments, e.g., Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v.
United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965). Similarly, the Boyle Court's goal of protecting
discretionary functions is at least consistent with the various reasons the courts have formulated
to justify immunizing military decisions from review. Compare United States v. S. A. Empresa
De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (aim of discretionary
function exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of regulatory decisions) with Tozer, 792
F.2d at 406 (lay juries cannot review military decision choices). Finally, the Boyle Court's
description of the federal interest at stake in litigation involving government contractors, "interest
in getting the Government's work done," is probably broad enough to take in any other policy
reasons that courts have relied upon to warrant adopting the defense. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514.
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anticipated the result in Boyle by linking the federal interests that made
the defense attractive as a matter of policy to the decision to apply federal
common law to the issues of the defense. 238
Boyle's holding that state law is displaced does not weaken the policy
basis of the government contractor defense. As one court has pointed out,
earlier decisions holding state law to control the government contractor
defense were reached in contexts distinct from current military procure-
ment. 23 9 Thus, approval of the Ninth Circuit's policy approach to the
defense240 was an implicit part of the Boyle majority's focus upon the
reasons for displacing state law.
B. Shift to FTCA and Discretionary Function Immunity
Until Boyle, the elements of the government contractor defense were
linked to the Feres-Stencel doctrine, which barred actions against the
government brought by servicemen injured incident to service as well as
contractors' third party indemnity claims. 241 Yet, the Court's decision to
base the government contractor defense on discretionary function immunity
did no violence to precedent. First, concern for protecting military judg-
ments and decisions from judicial second-guessing is a key reason justifying
the Feres-Stencel doctrine. 242 That concern, albeit applied more generally,
is similar to the concern the Court recently recognized as underlying the
immunity for discretionary functions. 243 Moreover, at least where a court
insists that government approval of a design follow substantial government
238. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690, 701-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1984);
Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 845-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
239. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. at 712. The court
distinguished earlier government contractor defense cases as having involved items built to speci-
fications some time previous and then later causing injury to civilians. Id. Further, the court
argued that the kinds of defects in other cases applying the defense as a matter of state law
concerned manufacturing defects of the type routinely regulated by state law. Id.
240. In McKay, the Ninth Circuit developed four policy arguments. See McKay v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). By adopting
the McKay elements of the defense, the Supreme Court at least implicitly approved the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning.
241. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. The shift from Feres to discretionary function immunity does
result in one significant change in the scope of the government contractor defense. Feres-type
actions, by definition, involve plaintiffs who could not have brought an action against the
government because of their military status. But under an FTCA-discretionary function exception
approach, the government contractor defense bars a suit by a civilian against a contractor even
though Feres would not have barred his suit against the government.
242. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Stencel Aero
Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977) (military decisions should not be second-
guessed)), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988).
243. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1983) ("Congress wished to prevent
judicial 'second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic
and political policy through the medium of an action in tort.").
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review of specifications, the type of decision involved clearly depends upon
the exercise of official discretion.2 44
Nevertheless, Boyle separated the government contractor defense from
the Feres-Stencel doctrine, 245 which guards the government's retained im-
munity where military discipline is concerned. In contrast to the relatively
static need for discipline and the relation of a soldier to the government,
the discretionary function exception protects the government's ability to
respond to changing priorities.2 46 Some of Feres' supporting logic was held
not to be applicable to the contractor defense.2 47 The Boyle Court's shift
244. See, e.g., Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517 (1988) (design of military equipment is "assuredly a
discretionary function"). The district court for the state of Maryland anticipated the holding in
Boyle. In Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co., 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987), aff'd, 874 F.2d
946 (4th Cir. 1989), a civilian aircraft mechanic brought suit for injuries arising out of the
accidental firing of an aircraft ejection seat. The court noted the standard policy arguments in
support of the government contractor defense. But it atypically emphasized both Feres and
discretionary function immunity as interests sought to be protected by the government contractor
defense. Id. at 989 (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34-36 (1953) and United States
v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984)).
As the district court indicated, the cost pass-through argument is as applicable to discretionary
function immunity as it is to the Feres doctrine. Ramey, 656 F. Supp. at 989 ("To impose liability
on the contractor under such circumstances would render the Government's immunity for the
consequences of acts in the performance of a 'discretionary function' meaningless, for if the
contractor was liable, contract prices to the Government would be increased."). See also Sanner
v. Ford Motor Co., 144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43, 47 (1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super 407, 381
A.2d 805 (1977), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 616, 384 A.2d 846 (1978) (defense procurement carried out
through government's war powers presumably of constitutional origin and therefore government
"must be given wide latitude in its decision-making process").
Although not a part of the district court's analysis in Ramey, the fact that the aircraft was a
full-scale development (pre-production) version of a high-performance fighter lent credence to
earlier statements that the expectation of safety is less when technologically sophisticated military
hardware is involved. See, e.g., McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983)
(military pilots' sense of duty and mission takes account of inherently risky nature of military
aviation, particularly fighter aircraft), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
245. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. Feres immunity was only an element of the McKay defense; it
was a necessary but not a sufficient condition. McKay, 704 F.2d at 453. Feres-Stencel provided
a source of policy arguments in favor of the defense, such as the dilemma created by Stencel,
which denied indemnity to the contractor, but which also reaffirmed the federal government's
immunity from suit by an injured serviceman. See Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States,
431 U.S. 666, 669-74 (1977). Although the majority opinion in Boyle argued that Feres had been
a part of several courts' preemption analysis, it was by far more important as support for the
policy underlying the government contractor defense. See also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S.
681, 692 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A reading of Justice Scalia's dissent in Johnson reveals
that the shift away from the Feres doctrine in his opinion for the Court in Boyle was not
unexpected. In his dissent in Johnson, he indicated that he believed Feres was wrongly decided
and could be overruled. Id. at 692-700.
246. See, e.g., Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 816-20 (1984) (FAA's engineering and inspection
programs account for primary safety responsibility resting in hands of aircraft manufacturers, not
the federal government).
247. The Court did carry forward the point that allowing suit would tend to subvert the
government's immunity (in this case, because of increased prices). Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2517. The
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away from Feres does more than weaken the validity of that doctrine. It
indicates that the purposes of governmental immunity are more significant
than a mere extension of the sovereign's immunity and instead are linked
to "getting the Government's work done.
'248
C. Elements of the Defense
The Court's choice of law holding and its reliance on discretionary
function immunity were generally consistent with precedent. But the Court's
statement of the elements of the government contractor defense proceeded
under some changed assumptions. The focal point of the majority opinion
was the Ninth Circuit formulation of the defense adopted in McKay v.
Rockwell International Corp., which was keyed to government establish-
ment or approval of reasonably precise specifications. 249 Despite the ease
with which the McKay standard gained acceptance in federal courts, 250 it
emerged from Boyle appearing to offer defense contractors a different
cloak of immunity. The Court's analysis increased the relevance of the
government's review process as well as the level of contractor knowledge
relied upon in the design process.
The first element of the defense requires that the government established
or approved reasonably precise specifications. It should be noted that the
Court limited the scope of this element by providing two counter-examples
arguments concerning the Veterans' Benefits Act and the need for uniformity of governmental
liability were not mentioned. For a discussion of the illogic of these arguments, see United States
v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 692-700 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). "[U]nfairness to servicemen of
geographically varied recovery is, to speak bluntly, an absurd justification .... " Id. at 695.
Justice Scalia's dissent is a series of refutation and disproof intended to deny validity to all of
Feres' supporting logic. Further, the majority opinion in Boyle read the doctrine into the
preemption analyses of courts that did not decide the preemption issue. See supra note 208. The
doctrine's apparent malleability, and the fact that Justice Scalia wrote the Boyle majority opinion
which both deemphasizes and rewrites the doctrine's precedential history, may signal that Feres
has only weak stare decisis value to commend it. At the very least, the Court's limiting of the
rationale underlying Feres to the protection of military discipline and decisions in United States
v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985), is still valid after Boyle, notwithstanding the approach
taken by the majority in Johnson, 481 U.S. at 689-91, which mentioned the Veterans' Benefits
Act and uniformity but rested its decision on the "substantial" potential that military discipline
might be implicated. Id. at 691-92.
248. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2514. Boyle nonetheless left unresolved other questions concerning
civilian contractors and the defense. See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
249. The Court essentially adopted the elements as stated in McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984), eliminating only the
requirement that the government be immune under Feres for the defense to apply. Boyle, 108 S.
Ct. at 2518.
250. See, e.g., Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing McKay as seminal
case on military contractor defense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190-91 (2d Cir. 1987) (agreeing with Tozer's policy basis for
the defense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988). Thus, courts that followed McKay sharpened
that decision's emphasis on the government contractor defense particularly as it related to military
equipment manufacturers.
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to the situation that was presented in Boyle, both involving specifications
that had not been the subject of government review. 25' In both examples,
the majority unequivocally stated that federal interests would be insufficient
to justify the preemption of state tort law. 252 This approach is narrower
than the Agent Orange I approach, which placed little emphasis on the
establishment of specifications, 23 as well as the McKay defense, which
required only the establishment or approval of reasonably precise specifi-
cations . 2 4
The Court expressly grounded the government's establishment or ap-
proval of specifications as the defense's first element upon the need to
assure immunity for discretionary functions. 25 To ensure that the defense
251. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. The first hypothetical example involved an air conditioner for
which the government had not specified a certain safety feature. Since the duty to supply the air
conditioner as specified would not conflict with a state law duty of care to include the safety
feature, the Court stated, federal law would clearly not preempt state law. Id. The other
hypothetical concerned a stock model helicopter ordered by number and without meaningful
review of the specifications. The Court indicated that the government's interest was not implicated
merely in its getting what it ordered. Id.
The latter example may have a significant bearing upon the question of how much government
review of specifications is necessary before a bona fide "approval" can be said to have been
given. The example expressly admits of a complete lack of review of specifications, since the order
was for an inventory item and was placed by model number alone.
252. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. An issue that arises is whether the validity of the government's
establishment or approval of specifications depends on the contractor's warning of known dangers
(the third element). See Wilson v. Boeing, 655 F. Supp. 766, 773 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (approval of
specifications valid independent of contractor's discharge of duty to warn). A similar issue is
raised by developments in the Pentagon concerning bribery and other illegal activities in connection
with competition for procurement contracts. Contractors, acting through consultants, obtained
advance and in some instances classified information concerning specifications of competitively
bid procurement contracts. See Federal Investigators Pursue Dozens of Defense Contractors,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 27, 1988, at 16-22. Even apart from the criminal conduct,
the alleged illegal activity raises the issue that the government's approval, and certainly its discretion,
were short-circuited by contractors possessing information concerning the proposals of competitors
or other classified data.
For later developments in the procurement scandal, see How a Spy for Boeing and His Pals
Gleaned Data on Defense Plans. Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1990, at Al, col. 6; Loral Corp. Pleads
Guilty in Defense Case, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1989, at A6, col. 4.
253. See Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (first element met where
the product supplied was the product specified by the government; burden described as minimal).
254. See McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983) (court remanded
for determination of whether government had established or approved specifications), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1043 (1984). Cf. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 407-08 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Air
Crash at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985) (contractor participation does not bar defense
where government provided more than rubber stamp), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986)), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988); Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 744 (11th
Cir. 1985) ("under McKay test mere government approval of a contractor's design" sufficient for
defense), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 574 n.23
(5th Cir. 1985) (Third Circuit approval cases not considered; parties stipulated approval of
specifications element).
255. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. Because the Court has held that the nature of the conduct
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would be available only where the government's approval had involved the
exercise of discretion, the Court required a level of governmental review
materially higher than merely a rubber stamp.256 The Third Circuit cases,
particularly Air Crash at Mannheim, focused on defining the requisite
intensity of review25 7 leading to approval, but Boyle did not. 25 a The Court's
use of ambiguous language-a government officer must have "considered"
a proposed design-indicates that it did not invalidate the Third Circuit's
inquiry into governmental review. Moreover, the link that the majority
opinion drew between minimally acceptable governmental design review
and the underlying policy of insulating discretionary decisions indicates
that scrutiny of the review and approval process is an integral part of the
defense.
25 9
The third element of the defense, requiring the contractor to warn the
government of latent dangers or risks, also relates to the design process in
which specifications are generated. The original Agent Orange II defense
compared the degrees of knowledge of the government and contractor, but
McKay required the contractor to act to inform the government. 26° The
problem with Boyle, however, is that the Court provided little if any
guidance as to how its decision relates to the contractor's elevated duty to
involved, rather than the status of the actor, is the test for discretionary functions, United States
v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984), then determining whether discretion was exercised in
procurement decisions depends on whether the government was able to balance risks and benefits.
See, e.g., Bynum, 770 F.2d at 574-75 (balancing of such factors central to military decisions that
should not be second-guessed).
An analysis of discretionary function immunity, which retains the planning-operational level
distinction, does not yield a different result as applied to procurement decisions. First, Boyle states
that merely giving the government what it wants-which is the equivalent of an operational level
decision-is insufficient to justify displacing state law. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2516. Second, to the
extent that the decisionmaker's level of authority is relevant, it is only one factor pertinent to
whether discretion was exercised. Varig, 467 U.S. at 813. Finally, the information flow sought to
be protected by the defense is of a sufficiently complex and technical character so as to indicate
that decisions based on such information were made at the planning level. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at
2518.
256. The Boyle Court stated: "[tlhe first two of these [elements] assure that the suit is within
the area where the policy of the 'discretionary function' would be frustrated-i.e. they assure that
the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the
contractor itself." Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. Thus, the Court stated that weighing several factors
necessarily involves discretion, particularly where there is a trade-off between safety and efficiency.
Id.
257. See supra notes 138-52 and accompanying text.
258. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518 (government officer must have "considered" a contractor's
specifications).
259. But Boyle does not expressly define what constitutes a government officer's "consider[ing]"
a design. See also infra notes 264-67 (discussion of cases on the approval element).
260. Compare Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (compares relative
knowledge of contractor and government) with McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444,
453 (9th Cir. 1983) (contractor has duty to warn government of risks), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984). This element is designed to ensure that the government had sufficient information
to weigh risks and benefits. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
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inform the government of risks under the modified defense set forth in
Agent Orange Settlement Opinion.261 In that case, the district court imposed
on contractors a greater burden, one heavily influenced by a contractor's
expertise, and elevated the contractors' duty to warn based on the technical
nature of the product and the fact that the contractors had years of
experience with the basic components of the herbicide from civilian pro-
duction. 262 The district court contemplated that the contractors could have
had information that, had it been divulged, might have influenced the
government's decisions concerning the use of Agent Orange.2 63 Boyle's
reliance on the discretionary nature of military design choices implicates
the same concerns because the government's review of contractor specifi-
cations presupposes that the contractor has applied its expertise to the
fullest extent.
Arguably, Boyle rejected the modified defense that emerged from Agent
Orange Settlement Opinion, because that defense imposed on contractors
a duty to warn that is higher than the McKay standard. 264 Indeed, the
majority opinion summarily rejected the Eleventh Circuit formulation of
the defense that placed a significantly heavier duty to warn of defects on
the contractor.2 65 But the modified formulation of the defense may not be
261. The Supreme Court did not rely on any of the Agent Orange litigation as authority for
its opinion in Boyle. But see Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 557, 567 n.14, 576 n.29 (5th Cir.
1985) (rejecting modified Agent Orange warning element that was based on a "knew or should
have known" standard).
262. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988). In affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment
against the opt-out plaintiffs, the Second Circuit held that under either formulation of the test,
the plaintiffs could not overcome the defense. The court declined to discuss which version of the
defense applied, relying instead on its rulings that the government's knowledge was at least equal
to that of the contractor's and that the lack of any evidence of causality rendered the alleged
failure to warn of defects meaningless. Id.
263. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). The modified test would be satisfied
if the government's knowledge was at least equal to that of the contractor, or if the government
would have ordered production notwithstanding knowledge equal to what "defendant should have
had." Id.
264. In contrast, the majority of courts before Boyle required disclosure only of known risks.
See Bynum, 770 F.2d at 575-76 n.28.
265. The Eleventh Circuit's Shaw test requires the contractor to warn of defects and alternatives,
and further requires that the government expressly accept the risk. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace
Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988). Note that the modified
Agent Orange defense resembles the Shaw formulation, particularly with regard to the second
clause:
(1) that the government knew as much as or more than [the] defendant knew or
reasonably should have known about the dangers of Agent Orange or (2) even if the
government had as much knowledge as [the] defendant should have had, it would
have ordered production of Agent Orange in any event and would not have taken
steps to reduce or eliminate the hazard.
Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 849. Even before the Settlement Opinion
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so easily explained away. The district court's arguments in Agent Orange
Settlement Opinion 66 relate quite closely to the Boyle Court's focus upon
discretionary functions, in particular the scrutiny of the review process the
Court implicitly sanctioned. Because the Boyle Court fashioned a defense
that seeks to protect discretionary functions, the modified standard's broader
scope of the contractor's duty to warn the government would still appear
to be valid. 267 The defense depends upon the discretionary review of spec-
ifications, and it would not serve that process to allow highly experienced
defense contractors to deny the government the benefit of their expertise.
IV. IMPACT
After Boyle, three issues remain open. First, the Court did not clearly
determine the status of the Third Circuit's approval standard, inasmuch as
it ignored that line of cases. Second, although the Eleventh Circuit intended
its formulation of the defense to serve some of the same policy goals as
the approach of the Boyle Court, the question remains whether the Court's
holding deprives the Eleventh Circuit test of all validity. Third, the decision
may encourage the courts to apply the defense to actions brought against
contractors in the civilian sector.
A. The Third Circuit
The government contractor defense requires that the defendant show
that the contract specifications were established or approved by the gov-
ernment. In Air Crash at Mannheim, the Third Circuit adopted an approach
which considers the roles of both the contractor and the government.
26
Under this approach, contractor participation in design does not bar the
assertion of the defense; for the government's part, its approval must
raised the contractor's duty to warn of risks, the district court had consistently looked to whether
the government, if informed, would have reached a different decision, in terms approaching an
objective standard. Agent Orange II, 534 F. Supp. 1046, 1057 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (defense depends
on contractor's lack of knowledge of hazards "which, if known to the government, might have
altered the government's decisions"; hazards are those "that might reasonably have affected the
government's decision").
266. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 849. The reason for modifying the
standard was to prevent encouraging contractors to know as little as possible.
267. The modified defense in the Settlement Opinion is stated in the alternative. Id. at 849.
Even if the second clause, which is similar to the Eleventh Circuit defense that was rejected in
Boyle, is invalid, then reasoning supporting a "knew or should have known" standard for
warnings may nevertheless be valid. There is nothing in Boyle that directly negates the district
court's reasoning that the higher standard for warnings is needed to balance the fact of compelled
wartime production against contractor experience from the civilian sector. Id.
268. Air Crash at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
The Third Circuit held that participation by itself did not block the contractor from asserting the
defense; nevertheless the court construed the first element to require that the government have
participated substantially in setting the specifications for the defense to apply. Id. at 122.
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follow substantial review of specifications in order to set up the defense,
''mere approval" being insufficient .269
Boyle does not directly address the Third Circuit's line of cases inter-
preting the first element of the defense.170 The Court's only statement
regarding approval of specifications was too general to be instructive. 27'
Nor did the Court advance reasons why McKay provides a better approach
to cases where the level of government review of specifications is at issue. 27 2
Nevertheless, the Court's holding that the FTCA's discretionary function
exception defines the scope of federal interest for preemption purposes is
269. Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821
(1985). The greater scrutiny that the Third Circuit gives to the first element of the defense does
not appear to be losing any of its impetus. In Powell v. Boeing Vertol Co., No. 84-5503 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 4, 1986) (WESTLAW, DCT database), the action arose out of a military helicopter
crash. The apparent cause was pilot error, leading the plaintiff to allege that aural warnings
should have been part of the radar altimeter avionic equipment. In granting the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court applied the Koutsoubos test and found it satisfied
because the contract language alone showed that the government had approved the specifications.
Id.
270. The Court did not discuss or even cite the Third Circuit cases, which interpret the Agent
Orange II defense. These decisions considered the logic of McKay, and did not rely upon the
Feres doctrine either for policy or preemption purposes. Not only is it apparent that Boyle did
not overrule them, but the Court's holding that discretionary function immunity underlies the
federal interest in the government contractor defense supports the Third Circuit's logic. In fact,
in rejecting the Shaw test, the Court stated that the discretionary function rationale could apply
to designs even when "the contractor rather than" the government developed them. Boyle v.
United Technologies, Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2518 (1988) (emphasis added).
271. The first two elements of the defense "assure that the design feature in question was
considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself." Id. at 2518. This
language, however, does not define what level of review preceding approval is a requisite of the
defense.
272. In Trevino v. General Dynamics Corp., 626 F. Supp. 1330 (E.D. Tex. 1986), the court
resolved the issue of the military contractor defense against the contractor. In that case, the
defendant was under contract with the United States Navy to perform certain modification work
to a nuclear submarine. Id. at 1332. Five Navy divers were killed in an airlock which failed to
protect them against decompression. The specifications in the contract were quite general thus,
whether the government approved the detailed specifications developed by the contractor was a
key issue. Id. at 1336. After reviewing the Third Circuit cases, the court ruled that mere approval
of the design was insufficient and emphatically concluded that General Dynamics had been
responsible for the design defects in question. Id. at 1337.
The court called into question one of the assumptions of the military contractor defense: that
issues of design are necessarily beyond judicial review.
Public policy, however, does not require any judicial restraint in this case simply
because this Court is not reviewing military decisions relating to the armed forces.
The Plaintiffs are not challenging a military decision concerning military operations.
The issue is a design decision concerning design defects in the diving hangar aboard
the [submarine] made by General Dynamics designers. This was purely a non-military
decision requiring no military expertise. Nor was there a conscious decision on the
part of the military to accept a known hazard because of military considerations.
Id. at 1334. Quite apart from its renewal of the basic Feres logic that military decisions are not
reviewable, Boyle's rejection of the Eleventh Circuit test does not necessarily resolve the approval
issue. The Third Circuit has emphasized how much review; the Eleventh, what is reviewed.
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strongly indicative of an implied endorsement of the Third Circuit. Because
discretionary functions are determined by review of the nature of the
conduct involved,21" the approach in Air Crash at Mannheim that depends
upon substantial review of specifications appears to be consistent with
Boyle.
B. Eleventh Circuit
In Boyle, the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit formulation of the
government contractor defense2 7 4 because the court of appeals had not
designed it to protect discretionary functions.2 75 In Shaw, the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a defense with two prongs, either of which would have
immunized the contractor from suit. Essentially, the defense required that
the contractor have participated only minimally in the design process, or
that the government gave its express approval to the design after the
contractor's disclosure of risks. 76 The Court's criticisms of the Shaw
defense, however, do not completely account for the concerns raised in the
Eleventh Circuit's decision.
The Court's first criticism was apparently directed at Shaw's first prong,
which would have been satisfied only if the contractor participated no
more than minimally in the design process. It is clear, as the Court stated,
that even government design choices that accept specifications developed
by a contractor are discretionary decisions. 27 7 If the government contractor
defense is to protect discretionary decisionmaking regardless of the level
of contractor participation in the design process, then the key to the defense
is the extent of governmental review of contractor proposals . 2 7  Discretion
cannot be protected where it has not in fact been exercised. The Third
Circuit approach provides the advantage of specifying the level of con-
tractor participation that the defense will protect. 279 In contrast, Boyle
leaves it up to the courts to construe whether the government adequately
273. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984). The Court stated in Boyle that it
sought to "protect discretionary functions" by assuring that contractors not withhold "information
highly relevant to the discretionary decision." Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. Boyle therefore protects
federal interests where the approval standard in Air Crash at Mannheim necessarily would have
to be satisfied, if the government did base its review upon highly relevant information.
274. Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
275. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
276. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
277. A "significant policy judgment by Government officials" could underlay approval of the
contractor's design. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518. The Third Circuit defense moreover, does not
preclude assertion of the defense merely because the contractor participated in the design process.
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985).
278. See, e.g., Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 n.18. (11th Cir. 1985)
("Where the expertise of the contractor is superior, the military may simply be working in the
dark."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
279. Air Crash at Mannheim, 769 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082 (1986).
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evaluated the contractor's proposal. Contractors, no matter how intensive
their research and development, will assert that their proposals received
substantial review prior to approval.
The Court also criticized the second prong of the Eleventh Circuit's
Shaw defense which required that the contractor inform the government
of risks and then proceed only after receiving the government's express
and knowing approval.2 0 This scenario clearly falls within the discretionary
function exception as defined in United States v. Varig Airlines.2s' But the
Court rejected this prong of Shaw as well, stating that it deters participation
because the contractor must have identified all design defects to establish
the defense.2 12 Nevertheless, under Boyle highly knowledgeable defense
contractors may still have an increased duty to disclose risks.
In approving the McKay formulation, the Court's key concern was to
protect the government's discretionary choices and the contractor input
which informs those choices. 283 While Boyle recognized that the contractor's
expertise is important in military procurement, the Court did not discuss
whether increased participation in design or experience with the type of
product in question should trigger a higher duty to warn. The modified
defense that arose from the Agent Orange litigation s2 4 in fact, applies
where the contractor had years of experience with a highly technical prod-
uct. In that situation, the contractor participation sought to be protected
in Boyle may well have occurred during the contractor's prior experience.
Failing to impose a higher duty to warn on such a contractor thus can
have the perverse result of encouraging the government, in the interest of
being fully informed, of contracting with less technically sophisticated
manufacturers.
280. Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
281. 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984). The Court did not suggest otherwise, and instead based its
criticism on protection of contractor incentives to contribute to the design process. Interestingly,
however, the contractor's duty to inform the government would not necessarily be identical to its
duty under the contract, but neither would it necessarily be contrary-a situation the court earlier
had stated was insufficient to justify preemption of state law. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
108 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1988).
282. Id. at 2518 ("While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule, it is
not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the 'discretionary function'
exception.").
283. Boyle explained the warning, or third element as encouraging the contractor to divulge
"knowledge of risks," and to provide "information highly relevant to the discretionary decision."
Id. at 2518.
284. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 849 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818
F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988). The defense in this form was not
linked to the contractor's "years of experience" deriving from civilian production, although the
court did contrast the case to actions involving primarily military products, or civilian products
modified for military use. The court instead described technical expertise with the components of
the Agent Orange herbicide acquired during civilian production. Cf Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770
F.2d 556, 567 n.14, 576 n.29 (5th Cir. 1985) (not rejecting modified defense, but finding it
inapplicable, because Army lab had designed vehicle in question).
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Like the Shaw rule that the Court rejected, the Agent Orange Settlement
Opinion modified defense was stated in the alternative. Either the con-
tractor could prove that the government knew as much or more about risks
of the product as the contractor knew or should have known, or the
contractor could establish that even if the government had equal knowledge,
it nevertheless would have ordered production. 285 Thus, the Court's criticism
that the Shaw test puts contractors unduly at risk 86 does not necessarily
apply to those contractors possessing a high degree of technical knowledge.
The Shaw rule works no greater hardship on such contractors than the
"knew or should have known" standard.
Both Shaw and the defense in Agent Orange Settlement Opinion apply
to situations where the government makes a clear choice to proceed once
informed of risks.287 Particularly in the procurement of technically complex
equipment, the government contractor defense can best protect the federal
interest in discretionary choices if the government can rely on contractors
who share in the benefit of their knowledge. The Supreme Court did reject
the Shaw formulation, but because the Court did not refer to the modified
defense, the courts will continue to be confronted with the argument that
a more stringent warning standard should be imposed upon contractors.
C. Civilian Contractors
Early cases applying the government contractor defense arose in the
civilian sector;288 those decisions were based on extending the precursors
of the defense to government contracting. McKay, however, dealt with
military equipment, both in reasoning and in formulation of defense.289
Moreover, Boyle clearly was concerned principally with military procure-
ment.290 Because the defense developed in the context of military procure-
285. Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp. at 849. The contractor would still be
required to prove the first two elements of the defense; only the third was modified.
286. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2518.
287. Compare Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11 th Cir. 1985) (second
part of second prong requiring government ordering production after contractor's disclosure of
risk), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2896 (1988) with Agent Orange Settlement Opinion, 597 F. Supp.
at 849 (modified third element of defense; second alternative provides that even with knowledge
equal to that of contractors, the government would have ordered production).
288. McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. 1980); Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Il1.
App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977).
289. McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1043 (1984). See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (McKay adapted earlier
defense to military contractors), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2897 (1988). See also Shaw, 778 F.2d at
740 n.6 (major weapon system-Grumman A-6 aircraft-clearly within definition of what is
military equipment); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 573 n.22 (5th Cir. 1985) ("pretermit[ing]
the question whether asbestos" is 'military equipment').
290. Boyle, 108 S. Ct. at 2513, 2517-18.
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ment, it is not surprising that the applicability of the defense to civilian
contractors has been unclear.29'
The question remains whether Boyle's focus on military procurement will
narrow the defense and preclude its continuing assertion by civilian con-
tractors. Courts have applied the various formulations of the defense to
claims arising in the civilian sector,2 92 and more recent cases have found
that in material respects the civilian context also justifies allowing the
contractor to establish the defense. 293 Because the Court's approach in
Boyle was to relate the elements of the defense to the need to protect
discretionary functions, it therefore appears that the defense will continue
to apply to civilian contractors as well.
V. CONCLUSION
Boyle is more significant than a decision which merely selected a partic-
ular formulation of the government contractor defense from among the
various statements of the defense available in the circuit courts of appeals.
The Supreme Court held that the federal interest in procurement of military
equipment justifies displacement of state law in favor of federal common
law. The Court based the scope of federal preemption on discretionary
function immunity under the FTCA, rather than on the Feres doctrine.
The elements of the defense, taken from the Ninth Circuit's decision in
McKay, are keyed to government establishment or approval of reasonably
precise specifications once the contractor has divulged information about
risks otherwise unknown to the government.
Yet Boyle does not answer in detail the question of what the government
must do to adopt as its own, a set of specifications developed by a
contractor. Further, it does not relate the McKay defense to the modified
formulation that developed in the federal courts in Agent Orange Settlement
Opinion. While it settled broader principles, Boyle leaves it to lower courts
to interpret the requisites for establishing the elements of the defense.
Whether contractors are better protected if they seek detailed or cursory
review of their proposals, submitted upon complete or lesser disclosure of
risks, is a matter that awaits decisions applying the defense.
Neil G. Wolf
291. See Hansen v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 734 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1984)
(refusing government contractor defense because Texas law unclear); In re All Maine Asbestos
Litigation, 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1378 (D. Me. 1983) (summary judgment grounded on contractor
defense denied because court was uncertain whether defense applied in civilian sector).
292. E.g., Price v. Tempo, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (insufficient showing
pursuant to Third Circuit approach that government's knowledge equal or superior to defendants'
concerning risks of firefighters' gear reason to deny summary judgment to defendant).
293. Burgess v. Colorado Serum Co., 772 F.2d 844, 846 (1 lth Cir. 1985) (government contractor
defense not limited to military). See also Boruski v. United States, 803 F.2d 1421, 1430 (7th Cir.
1986) (application to civilian relationships well-established).

